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ABSTRACT 
This study offers a fine-grained analysis of James Cameron’s film, Avatar (2009), on several 
theoretical fronts to provide a view of the film from a cognitive cultural studies perspective. 
The insights gained from cognitive theory are used to situate the debate by indicating the value 
cognitive theories have in cultural criticism. The critical discourse analysis of Avatar that 
results is a vehicle for the central concern of this study, which is to understand the diverse, 
often contradictory, meaning-making exhibited by Avatar audiences. A focus on the 
construction of empathic responses to the film’s messages investigates the success of this 
polysemy. 
The central propositions of the study are that meanings and interpretations of the experience of 
viewing Avatar are made discursively; they are situated in definable traditions, mores and 
values; and this meaning-making takes place in a cognitive framework which allows for the 
technical reproduction and reception of the experience while providing powerful, emerging and 
cognitively plausible narratives. In an attempt to situate the film’s commercial success and its 
plethora of awards, including an Oscar for best art direction, the analysis takes a critical view 
of Cameron’s use of cultural stereotypes and the framing of the exotic other, and considers the 
continuing development of these elements over the whole series and product line or, as Henry 
Jenkins (2007) defines it, “transmedia”. In drawing the theoretical boundaries of the 
methodologies used in this study and in arguing for their complementarities, the study 
contributes to a renewal of Raymond Williams’ (1961) mostly forgotten claim of the cross-
disciplinary cognitive dimension of cultural studies and demonstrates an affirmation of this 
formulation as cognitive cultural studies. 
KEYWORDS: cognitive – cultural studies, theory of mind, empathy, polysemy, film analysis, 
Avatar, James Cameron  
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PROLOGUE 
         Clip 1: White mercenaries prepare for Na’vi attack 
When James Cameron’s Avatar premiered on US screens on December 16, 2009, I made 
sure I was there to see it. The Arlington, Virginia, 3D iMAX cinema complex is a stone’s 
throw from the Pentagon and it was Marine day out for soldiers stationed at nearby bases. 
The long, dark passageway out of the theatre only half-prepared me for the foyer, filled as 
it was with Marines dressed identically to their actor counterparts in the movie showing 
inside. 
Suddenly, a young Marine walking out with me exploded in outrage, his eyes searching for 
something, finding mine, “It ain’t like that, you never find the white guys like that in the 
battlefield man, it’s us who be in the front line, fuck this shit!” 
I nodded empathically and passed on, having my own sense of dissonance from watching 
the film; his had caused an outburst and mine led me to delve deeper into my own 
oppositional readings to try to unpack all its elements and to one day find myself 
completing this study. 
As I left the complex, the sky was bright American blue and I filed away a mental image 
of the young man’s nametag, Cpl. Hall, ironically, stitched like history on his chest. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only practical 
consequence, we have to create ourselves as a work of art” (Michel Foucault, 1961). 
1.1 Background 
There is a level on which James Cameron’s 2009 film is genuinely exciting and it reflects the 
film’s overarching premise, reflected by its title, Avatar, that consciousness could be shifted 
from one neural system to another. This seemingly far-fetched science fictional element is, in 
fact, the film’s greatest strength reflecting very real, mostly recent research in human 
cognition and its deeper philosophical implications. Recent data produced by cognitive 
science, mostly led by researchers active in medical pathology, have infused new life into 
classical philosophy on the nature of subjective human experience, the mind and age-old 
nature/nurture binaries. 
Media-savvy and popularly accessible scientists have built bridges between the arts and the 
physical sciences which have made this modest study possible. For example, Ramachandran’s 
(1993, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2011) groundbreaking discoveries into phantom limb 
pain have contributed complex ideas, such as body schemas, embodiment and neural 
plasticity, to both new science and emerging cognately plausible art that find expression in 
cultural artefacts like Avatar.  
These advances give substance to post-modern understandings that fluidity and uncertainty in 
meaning-making and values lead to an ambiguous freedom, resulting in what is referred to by 
Michel Foucault as an opportunity “to create ourselves as a work of art” (1983: 237). At the 
same time, it does not necessarily follow that fluidity in meaning-making (in the production 
and consumption of artistic/cultural artefacts) implies the absence of artistic universals, 
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framed only by cultural historicism. Given that this research takes place in an academic study 
of art history, these discussions impact directly on the quest for artistic universals 
(Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999) and on understandings of individual artists’ 
responsibilities. It may be that this reference to greater yet still not fully-understood cognitive 
choices and processes piques (some of) Avatar audiences’ interests on an unconscious level 
while the conscious experience of the storyline and its visual effects rolls out in 3D and 
surround-sound. 
This study is concerned with the incongruencies in meaning-making across Avatar audiences  
and researches the tensions between dominant, emergent and residual ideologies (Williams, 
1961; Hall, 1983) in the construction of the film’s messaging since, as much as there is 
audience appreciation of Avatar, there is also an opposing sense of dissonance – the 
ideological character of which ranges vastly, from popular sources which characterise the film 
as a leftist attack on American society (Shone, 2010), through those who herald its apparently 
progressive analysis of power and economic corruption (Monbiot, 2010), to those, like 
myself, who maintain the film does not go nearly far enough in the critical integrity of its 
underlying implied analysis. 
In this research, video clips are texts that are presented as integral to the arguments made since 
they should, in fact, be regarded as quotes and are referenced as such. Although every attempt 
has been made to make the written text component of this research and its findings self-
contained, the study relies on the readers’ viewing of the clips to understand the fullness of 
its meanings. 
1.2 Titles and descriptors 
A deconstruction of the thesis title, “Neural narratives and natives: Cognitive attention 
3 
schema theory and empathy in Avatar1”, is useful for understanding the multi-disciplinary 
meanings employed in the study. 
Neural narratives is a play on words and refers to the fact that narratives are always the output 
of neurons (or nodes) arranged in particular ways in networks, whether the networks that 
support them are human or in any other way biological, or are (latterly) artificial. Stories are 
therefore dependent on neural systems to exist and perpetuate. At the same time, the Avatar2 
(Cameron, 2009) storyline is very much about neural networks and the interplay between 
human, alien and artificial. In using neuro-scientific insights as an aid to analysis, I suggest 
that the analysis draws on the cognitive sciences to assist in the interpretation of the film’s 
narratives and those of the audiences. 
“Natives” refers to notions of indigeneity, a major theme in Avatar, but I also refer to other 
nuances in the meaning of the word. In a very different context, so-called “digital natives” are 
distributed across our planet in ever-increasing margins of inequality (and here I include 
myself). Since a stark boundary is formed between those with access to technology and those 
who will never have the opportunity to sit in any form of theatre, including one with 3D 
projectors and surround-sound, “native” alludes to, among others, inclusion/exclusion, the 
competition for scarce resources and the politics of identity. The word also refers to 
colonialism and its derogatory subversion of the word’s dictionary meaning.3 On a meta-level, 
its ambiguity lends weight to my argument that meanings are fluid and serve those who have 
1 In this study the word 'avatar' is used in two senses: Avatar capitalized and italicised refers to the film, but  
lower-case avatar use refers to the generic term, as in below. 
2 The word “avatar” derives from a Sanskrit word meaning "descent," and has been largely appropriated as an 
electronic image that represents and may be manipulated by a computer user (as in a game). 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/avatar 
3 Origin: Late Middle English: from Latin nativus, from nat- “born”, from the verb nasci 
(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/native)  
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the power to fix meanings as memories. Further to this, given that a worldwide indigenous 
movement stands against the same sorts of power abuses endured by Avatar’s Na’vi and in 
the context of Cameron’s own political sensitivities and relationship with indigenous peoples 
of the Amazon basin, the choice of the name Na’vi is a subtle reference to audiences’ own 
fluid meaning-making as they engage with a powerful, new set of experiences and meanings 
associated with Cameron’s use of technology, and the attention which that demands.  
Cognitive attention schema theory refers directly to neuro-scientific advances in 
understandings of consciousness over the last 15 years, where tracking attention in animals, 
including humans, is becoming an exact science. This body of knowledge, which includes 
concepts of shared attention, mirror neuron mechanisms, mental-modelling or schema-
building and the construction of self, among others, goes directly to a theory of mind 
underpinning animal evolution in terms of sociability and survival. It also shows promise in 
making many further articulations of interest to this study: individual choice in the face of 
evolutionary biologies, audience reception processes and ideological identity, the function of 
artefacts to command attention, status and respect, and the concomitant responsibilities of the 
artists producing these and, most importantly, the power to transform social awareness.4 
Empathy, as a research focus, feeds into self-awareness through its role in mental model-
building or, as it is referred to in this paper, schema-building. Critical theory5 suggests that 
power and manipulation rely on the suppression of empathy to perpetuate. It may therefore 
follow that an understanding of self, as awareness of attention, could be applied to competing 
4 “Awareness” is a term that is used in many different ways. At this early stage, the attempt will be made to use 
the word in this research to replace or, at least, qualify the word “consciousness”. 
5 “Critical theory” refers to broad Marxist and neo/post Marxist traditions based in political economy, class 
analysis and the critique of captitalsim and its texts, but also in the sense that it attempts theoretical and praxic 
effects on “emancipation from slavery” and a “liberating … influence” in societies (Horkheimer 1972, 246).  
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elements of narrative construction and reception in Avatar to understand the power and 
diversity of meaning-making of the text, and its concomitant weaknesses. 
1.3 Synopsis 
A brief synopsis and commentary of the film, facilitated in the electronic version of this 
document by interactivity, is provided. This is not meant to pre-empt the textual analysis that 
follows in Chapters 3 and 4 but, since the literature is very broad, I feel it is productive to 
provide the story outline at this stage to focus the theoretical discussions. This informs my 
process of summarising the plot, without approaching it chronologically, in order to highlight 
the elements which are analysed later in this study.  
The film starts with (or catches up to) a future well in progress. Earth is environmentally and 
socially denuded, corporations rule the galaxy via paramilitary forces in a ruthless search for 
more mineral wealth and science plays second fiddle to the pursuit of profit. In other words, 
business as usual, extrapolated to its logical future. The images that follow are web-based 
files designed to link to video Play buttons and are included here to illustrate the film’s plot 
and storylines. 
6 
Clip 2: Science team sifts through derelict indigenous school 
A school built by anthropologists on Pandora6 has failed and development diplomacy has 
given way to espionage as the anthropologists embed one of their own into Na’vi culture. 
With military action always an option, science is given a chance by sending a recently disabled 
Marine’s awareness into a genetically engineered Na’vi body. This invading force aims to 
learn key strategic information of the Na’vi’s defences. In the following clip, Jake starts the 
bonding experience with his avatar body, originally based on his twin brother:  
6 “Pandora is the fifth moon of the gas giant Polyphemus (both names reference figures in Greek mythology), 
which orbits Alpha Centauri A in the Alpha Centauri System, the closest star system to our own sun. Discovered 
by space telescopes at some point between 2050 and 2077, Pandora has been the single most interesting thing to 
happen to the human race in hundreds of years” (https:/james-camerons-avatar.fandom.com/wiki/Pandora) 
7 
      Clip 3: Jake meets his avatar body for the first time 
The reason for the invasion, initiated by industry, backed by military and facilitated by 
scientists, is the exploitation of a rare element, unobtainium, but resistance from the owners 
of the mineral, the indigenous Na’vi,7 has escalated occupation of their planet. The following 
two clips show powerful visual metaphors implicating8 the modern American 
military/industrial/prison complex. Besides the critique of this self-affirming model of 
managing these institutions and their increasing totalitarianism, this visual metaphor 
introduces James Cameron’s critique of unbridled exploitation of our own planet’s natural 
resources: 
7 Note the semantic reference to “native”, as in “indigenous”, in the choice of the name, Na’vi. 
8 “Damning” may be a more apt word. 
8 
 Clip 4: Spaceship lands in fortified refinery 
 The division of labour and its stratification is significantly portrayed in Clip 5. Power lies with 
the inept, non-technical owner/administrator of the enterprise, represented by Selfridge Parker 
(played by Giovanni Ribisi) who struggles to negotiate the sophisticated 3D geo-mapping 
system in the command centre.  
 Clip 5: Corporate/military command centre 
Technicians and scientists are there to be ordered about, as are the mercenaries, in that order. 
Yet the command structure of the occupying force is only a mirror of the hierarchies at play 
throughout the film’s world – a pyramidical affair with capital at the top and indigenous 
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resource owners at the bottom.9 In short, a reconstruction of traditional Western conceptions 
of dominance over nature and social realities.  
The sophisticated motion graphics in this scene are very much part of the world Cameron 
creates as they reflect his technique of embedding one form of technology in other iterations 
of itself, i.e., 3D models inside the larger device of 3D delivery to audience optics. This filmic 
device provides a self-reflective commentary by Cameron on his medium, while creating 
elements of the visual “set”, a sort of self-exposé of his use of simulacra, to the extent even 
of reminding the viewer of the illusory nature of the experience. This scene also lays out the 
basis for the inevitable conflict which will ensue as a result of an indigenous village built on 
the largest deposit of unobtainium as its members fiercely resist relocation. 
But Jake relates too closely to the embodiment that comes with his occupation of an avatar 
body and, through the cultural insights that result from his relationship with Neytiri,10 he 
changes allegiances and ends up playing the saviour,11 an aspect that has been severely, but 
not universally, criticised. The primary conduit for Jake’s change of heart is romantic love, 
but his actions are motivated ultimately by altruistic rationality. Convinced of the moral 
integrity of his treachery to his officers, country and species, he puts non-material values 
above those of his mission and reaches a higher12 level of consciousness. However, 
consciousness is depicted as itself material, as in the sharing of the Na’vi bond in the following 
clip: 
9 Virtually on a par with the animals that populate Pandora. 
10 “Neytiri te Tskaha Mo’at’ite is the Na’vi princess of the Omaticaya clan. She is the second-born daughter of 
Eytukan and Mo’at and younger sister of Sylwanin” (https://james-camerons-avatar.fandom.com/wiki/Neytiri). 
11 “The avatar allows Jake to see, hear, and otherwise ‘sense’ the Na’vi culture, and the audience needs the same 
conduit to the Na’vi. Jake is OUR avatar” (Lyubansky, 2009). 
12 “Higher” as in more inclusive of others’ awareness and the imperatives that come from that awareness; a less 
ego-driven relationship with oneself and therefore a more “spiritual” cultural experience. 
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Clip 6: Jake and Neytiri share first kiss and neural link 
The Na’vi neural link, something they share with other species on the planet and, through the 
trees, with Pandora itself, is something not physically available to humans but an abstract and 
emotional schema of this link is possible. This is where Cameron’s ambition exerts itself in 
attempting to elicit the possibility of greater, more meaningful connectedness with audiences. 
With their love guiding their actions in the context of a communal acceptance of something 
akin to fate and myth, the pair of lovers, Jake Sully and Princess Neytiri are powerless to stop 
the carnage and now, mistrusted and bound by the indigenous, they witness their people suffer 
a ruthless military assault: 
      Clip 7: Military airstrike against the Na’vi  
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The plot plays out with Jake, in his Na’vi form, accessing deep, sacred warrior tropes, 
heroically taming the near-mythological creature Toruk,13 to unite all Pandoran life forms 
against the alien invader. By this time, most viewers would have picked sides or, more 
precisely, as Stuart Hall (1973) would argue, negotiated a preferred meaning.  
Note the silent body language exchange between Jake and Parker in Clip 8, with Parker 
casually strolling with his hands in his pockets as if to indicate that his actions were merely 
administrative, lacked personal responsibility and that he’s available for the same job if the 
indigenous so wishes – an inappropriate suggestion and typical of what Cameron might call 
the result of a sociopathic economic system which refuses to take responsibility for its actions.  
Interestingly, the indigenous warriors now have modern weapons, mirroring the development 
stage of leapfrogging into more advanced stages of capitalism through the appropriation of 
technologies, although this reference is unlikely to have been intended. 
 
          
    Clip 8: Alien invaders leave Pandora in disgrace  
 
13 “The Great Leonopteryx or Toruk is a species of airborne predatory animals native to Pandora” 
(https://list.fandom.com/wiki/Characters_and_wildlife_in_Avatar).  
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The ending obviously allows for sequels but gives bold political statements in Clip 8 asserting 
Cameron’s ideological position in a dramatic name-and-shame parade which makes clear both 
the future story tension lines and his own ideological imaginary. The sequels to Avatar, 
already in production (Libbey, [s.a.]), continue to build on the original14 with additional 
transmedia iterations, from games to theme parks,15 and a massive fan base16 which has 
embellished storylines and character profiles beyond anything published by Cameron. In this 
way, the film is accumulating meaning diversity, polysemy, in multiple ways, through the 
years and over the stories that are spawned by the original.17  
1.4 Thematic treatment 
The Avatar thematic world is both simple and complex and operates in an intricate interplay 
between the mental models and value systems of conflicting story elements and profound 
character development. This section sketches the thematic treatment of this interplay between 
story elements and how they are achieved by concentrating on the film’s use of neuroscience 
in its content and techniques. For example, the 3D effect of the Hallelujah Mountains, its 
scientific significance and Jake’s ignorance of science are presented in one compound scene 
in Clip 9: 
14 Albeit out of chronological sequence. 
15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMxeDMPvSnI&t=6s 
16 See, for example, http://www.fanpop.com/clubs/james-camerons-avatar 
17 See, for example, this story based entirely on the Toruk creature from Avatar 1: https://james-camerons-
avatar.fandom.com/wiki/Toruk_-_The_First_Flight 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clip 9: The hanging rocks of Hallelujah Mountains 
Visual processing in our brains required for the optical illusion that is 3D is still a novel 
experience for most audiences because of a palpable subjective sophistication in the 
experience. Adapting our neuron pathways to experience 3D is interventionist in nature as it 
monopolises that way of seeing to the complete exclusion of our usual pathways. This 
contrasts with Jake’s naiveté and, I would suggest, acknowledges our own gullibility and 
places us as subjects to the film, its messages and our own complex responses. For Cameron, 
the emotional effect of the disruption of our usual perceptions opens up what Pop (2009) calls 
the “double mirror”,18 which, Pop explains, operates at many levels. One of these levels works 
with the spectacular, providing a fantastical and romantic digital world which inversely 
mirrors a dystopian version of our own. In the aesthetic beauty of Pandora, its culture of 
connectedness is higher than the mundane horizon of value and emotional integrity. In this 
way, Cameron introduces the possibility, however fanciful, of other imaginaries of our future. 
The weaving of elements to support his strategy for changing audience minds using cognitive 
 
18 “In a word, Pandora is everything Earth is not, and, by consequence, the world we enter by magic is a complete 
reversal, a mirror replica of our own world. This is again the double mirroring we are looking for – Pandora is a 
negative replica of our own world, and in the same time the movie is mirroring for us, at an individual level, a 
dimension for escaping from reality into an artificial reality that is so palpable we cannot elude its attractiveness” 
(Pop, 2009: 25). 
14 
insights is built on existing, traditional narratival themes via a juxtaposition of opposites. The 
binaries created allow audience choice of meaning-making. In rejecting the violent, unjust, 
psychopathic, stereotypical values and the resulting self-destruction, audiences move towards 
the opposite values held by the film.19  
However, Hall (1973: 92) referring to media, said that “to put it paradoxically, the event must 
become a ‘story’ before it can become a communicative event”. This means that the encoding 
needs to take place largely in existing narratival forms to make the meaning common to 
audiences. There is much to be unpacked in the meaning-making process and this is explored 
in Chapter 3.2. The next section isolates some of the more important strands of these values 
and then highlights the resulting binaries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clip 10: Indigenous sacred ceremony 
The contrast between spiritually emotive scenes like those above and the seemingly damning 
critique of the US military industrial complex, as in Clip 11 below, forms the visual 
 
19 This is however not a seamless, simple process. Hall (1973) ,and many following him have established that 
meaning is negotiated through a process of rejection and acceptance of discourse. Dominant and oppositional 
meaning provide the backdrop to that negotiated response. But there is much more to this, for example, the 
process of neutralisation whereby meaning is reinterpreted in terms of dominant/hegemonic ideologies, 
whatever the values of its creators. 
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landscaping – the backdrop of good and evil of the film. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Clip 11: Gunship rotor blades and refinery background 
The plot, with its undertone of impending disaster attached to macro-economic realities and 
the hope of escaping this scenario in our “real” world, forms another theme where the 
contrasts in the aesthetics of nature versus those of polluted, heavy industry again mirror real 
life crises and options. Cameron uses his 3D scalability to full effect in Clip 12, showing the 
massive scale of open cast mining on Pandora, reflecting what is happening now in the 
Amazon, amongst other areas: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clip 12: Opencast mining on Pandora 
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Promises of solutions provided by increased empathy and awareness of environmental 
degradation is what drives the activism20 of James Cameron. While the degradation of forests 
has devastating consequences for the world of work and survival, Avatar is also very much 
about the value of play. The ability of computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create 
aesthetically pleasing exotic landscapes as fun escapist scenes where Cameron elevates play 
as a simple joy and essential therapeutic cultural practice, as seen in Clip 13 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clip 13: Jake and Neytiri relive the day’s flying 
Although the romantic trope is extensively exploited in this film, there is another layer to the 
tremulous tension usually faced by prospective lovers – species differentiation. One of the 
more interesting cognitive discourse innovations in Avatar is the way Cameron plays with 
embodiment. The following scene, Clip 14, shows the feeling of hyper awareness at the point 
of initial sexual association, made more poignant by the characters’ (and their viewers’) 
knowledge of the ambiguity of their species and its implications. Cameron undertakes an 
 
20 This promotional clip is intended to appeal to a general internet audience. It is also a public endorsement of 
Earth Day 2019 in the context of Avatar 2 production imperatives; an articulation of Cameron’s value system, 
specifically the need for “warrior” activism (significantly couched in an appeal to young US voters to register 
in the 2020 presidential elections). See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9t1egSivOro 
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ambitious experiment in empathy and transference, which is explored in depth in Chapter 4.1 
but, as will be explained, this is no easy task. The trope of romantic love achievable across 
species and despite hardship, war, betrayal and group loyalty, must be crafted incrementally 
and subtly, as in this first sexually oriented communication and physical contact. The 
suggestion of sexual union between Jake and Neytiri is a challenge to our own body 
boundaries but, since they are of the same species, we are more likely to gradually accept this, 
especially couched as it is in human romantic love and emotion. The limits of what audiences 
can process as acceptable visual representations and conceptual models of the human body 
are Cameron’s major challenges in the film. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Clip 14: Jake and Neytiri breach personal body space 
What is normal, even sanctioned, in the prevailing, hegemonic inter-gender binary in Avatar 
is extended explicitly in the scene above. The suspension of belief thrust on the viewers at 
this stage is a mere introduction to the logical conclusion of the trans-species implications of 
the romance they are required to accept as the film unfolds. Cameron is not only content with 
revisioning physical romance, but also with re-articulating masculinity mainly through the 
development of Sam Worthington’s character, but also in the depiction of indigenous male 
aggression and competition. Although Tsu’tey is fiercely antagonistic towards his rival for 
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Neytiri’s affections and, after Jake’s heroic actions, both men accept her decision in a way 
that is protective, but honourable – like Marines used to be. But, in depicting resistance in this 
way, there is the possibility to model indigenous masculinity as empowered and resistance 
itself as honourable. 
       Clip 15: Tsu’tey in full fighting flight 
Action-packed, masculine heroic adventure scenes abound in the film and Cameron is at pains 
to show that women have their equal place in them. In the following scene in Clip 16, woman 
warrior Neytiri shoots Colonel Quaritch (played by Steven Lang), the alpha macho 
commander of the military invading force, with a traditional male bow and arrow, so saving 
Jake who, at this stage, lies helpless in his avatar life support system.  
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Clip 16: Colonel Quaritch struck by Neytiri’s arrow 
But sexploitation is subject to changing cultural forms and norms as Donna Haraway (1989) 
describes: 
Reproduction has become the prime strategic question, a privileged trope for logics 
of investment and expansion in late capitalism, and the site of discourses about the 
limits and promises of the self as individual. 
The film’s producers truncated the following scene from the film version (Cameron, 2010) 
since the notion of alien sex is fraught with discomfort and ambiguity despite allowing 
multiple entry points for audience meaning-making, for polysemy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Clip 17: Jake and Neytiri share first kiss 
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The film’s liberal use of thematic binaries is represented visually in the next section as 
diptychs. Consider, for example, the way Clips 18 and 19 set out to contrast moments of good 
and evil: 
Clip 18: Seeds of the tree of souls Clip 19: Direhorse on fire 
Clips 20 and 21 juxtapose machine and biology: 
    Clip 20: Quaritch promises Jake real legs       Clip 21: Helicoradian plants snap shut 
Warrior worker and hunter/gatherer binaries are teased out in Clips 22 and 23: 
Clip 22: Pilot Trudy Chacon checks gunship          Clip 23: Na’vi hunts hexapedes 
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Sacred and profane is an ongoing binary, characterised in Clips 24 and 25: 
Alien and indigenous, and the shifting meaning of “alien” is explored, for example, in Clips 
26 and 27: 
Manufactured and organic realities and environments are juxtaposed in Clips 28 and 29 but 
the association of technology with evil and the opposite for organic are not convenient 
binaries. Rather, technology is presented as a necessary evil and the organic as a partial (but 
nevertheless utopian) mediator: 
         Clip 24: Neytiri with Sacred Tree seeds   Clip 25: Selfridge and his unobtainium 
      Clip 26: Kids play with Augustine’s hair      Clip 27: Quaritch gives orientation briefing 
  Clip 28: Jake enters the avatar chamber Clip 29: Neytiri sleeps in her forest canopy 
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Underpinning these major themes are those supporting the use of newly emerging 
neuroscience, genetics and artificial intelligence, as depicted in Clip 30:  
    Clip 30: Jake’s awareness transported to digital media 
Neuroscience and ideas of planetary consciousness are presented as different forms of the 
same thing – the one technological, the other organic. Clip 31 shows how this consciousness 
is elevated to the sacred: 
Clip 31: Jake is reborn Na’vi 
More detail on the elements mentioned above will be offered in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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1.5 Problem statement 
The dominance of Hollywood values in cultural meaning-making as part of the cultural capital 
available to a globalised audience is deeply entrenched. The acceptance of the “eco-tropes” 
now in use by fictional films like Avatar serves to subvert serious understanding of indigenous 
community issues and masks the mechanisms of global economics. Evidence that certain 
indigenous groupings have approached Cameron to be their champion abounds on the internet 
(Phillips, 2010), as is his enthusiastic response to them. This study challenges popular 
conceptions of the film as in any way revolutionary, beyond the key-tracking technologies 
used for the compositing production of its images and the innovative 3D camera system James 
Cameron designed to execute his vision.  
By re-evaluating some of the basic terms of this wide-ranging criticism, this study argues for 
an understanding of Avatar that explains its achievement in offering a successfully polysemic 
meaning-making experience for the audience, despite its many contradictions. In so doing, 
the study investigates the responsibilities of the artist in meaning-making in the creative acts 
of the production of cultural objects. Emerging conceptions of the self, provided by cognitive 
attention schema theory, provide more analytic substance to post-modernist notions of the self 
and its relationship to the body, and this, in turn, enables a synthesis between historicist, 
discursive critical traditions and cognitive science, especially in literary and cultural criticism 
(Fairclough, 1992; 2003; Hogan; 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2014, 
2015, Herman, 2007; 2013). 
1.6 Aims 
The aims of the study are firstly, to show the complementarities of cultural studies and 
cognitive science in the critique of cultural objects and, secondly, to undertake a cognitive 
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and cultural materialist analysis (Williams, 1977) of Avatar through those lenses. The 
selective application of this interdisciplinary approach contributes to an understanding of what 
cognitive cultural studies research denotes with reference to the recent increasing accessibility 
of knowledge about the brain. 
1.7 Objectives 
The objectives of the study are to select some of the literature pertinent to a creative synthesis 
of theoretical positions, as described above, and to show that meanings and interpretations of 
the subjective experience of Avatar are made discursively as negotiated meaning, but are 
nevertheless situated in definable historic traditions, mores, values and power relations. 
Simultaneously, this study endeavours to show that, while the cognitive and species-specific 
biological components and working mechanisms of humans provide for a vast range of 
cultural possibilities within our own bodies’ confines, a critical, discursive approach is 
essential to make sense of the way the elements of history and biology fuse in any one 
moment, in any particular culture. In undertaking this research on this specific film, the impact 
of emergent cultural phenomena in digital media is assessed for its contribution to contested 
meaning-making and a rapidly increasing global media literacy. 
1.8 Domain of the study 
The domain of this study is the interdisciplinary fields of film, narrative and cognitive cultural 
studies, and their intersections in the literary and cultural criticism of individual cultural 
objects. 
1.9 Limitations of the study 
This study is situated firmly in the critical tradition of the humanities and, although scientific 
paradigms are much more accessible today than ever before, I cannot make claims as a 
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physical scientist. But there are rich insights from authors in the relevant literature who do 
combine physical and social scientific and philosophical expertise (Hogan; 1999, 2001, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015; Ramachandran; 1998, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2011, 
Graziano; 2011, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2019; Gonzalez-Franco; 2018; Boyd; 2005, 2009, 
Herman; 2007, 2013a, 2013b, et al) and I refer to them in the normal scholarly manner. 
It is one of the challenges of this study to be selective in the choice of relevant theory which 
facilitates the application of attention schema theory (Graziano, 2011, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 
2019) to constantly seek to relate the theory to its central thread of how attention is exercised 
in the appreciation of cultural objects. In this sense (and in others), attention is contested 
ground, but the study takes the concept of attention further than the late capitalism 
commodification of “attention by attention merchants”, as Tim Wu (2016) frames the 
problem.  
The problem here is not only one of political economy and economic history. In this study, 
attention is taken as a basic building block of awareness, the sense of ourselves as subjective 
entities, and the driving force behind the existence of cultural objects, not only their 
profitability.  
There is no doubt that attention is contested and manipulated, especially subjected to a 
consumerist economic order. Although I accept and am informed by thorough economic 
history and political economy analyses of the culture industries, such depth cannot be fully 
encompassed into this analysis. Rather, I look at the role of attention in the production and 
marketing of Avatar as they pertain to meaning-making in the film and its transmedia 
iterations. To effect that, I need to empathise with audience responses.  
Furthermore, while conducting the study, I am acutely aware of the challenges in making 
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claims about individual subjective understanding and meaning-making of any product, when 
it is now so widely known that meaning-making is highly divergent in its subjective 
experience. It is necessary to make the distinction that, when I speak of meaning-making, I 
cannot restrict it to the meanings an artefact is assumed to hold for audiences. What is really 
under discussion here is the process of making meaning, not its results. In other words, an 
audience member does not make meaning of an artefact – rather we are involved in a constant 
process of mental model-building where viewing an artefact such as Avatar is one of the 
inputs into that process, which may occupy our attention to a lesser or greater extent, 
depending on our state of attention, itself at the mercy of a multitude of factors. 
1.10 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical and intellectual project of this study is to provide for a critical analysis of 
a media product (artefact, object) in such a way as to contribute to the transformative power 
of literary and cultural criticism (Fairclough, 1992a, 1992b, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2014); 
Hogan, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015; Herman, 2007, 
2013) 
This allows the analysis to combine relevant theories from post-modernism (Foucault; 1961, 
1972, 1983, Hogan; 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, Fairclough; 
1992a, 1992b, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2014) and cultural studies (Williams; 1961, 1977, Hall; 
1973, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1996, 1997, 2001) with the insight that the self and social 
consciousness are evolutionarily and biologically constructed (Graziano; 2011, 2015, 2017, 
2019) yet fragmented in their ontological, subjective and cultural experiences (Van Dijk; 
1995). Similarly, this deconstruction fits comfortably in a search for how social construction 
interacts on a human biochemical level by referring to the wealth of cognitive psychology that 
has integrated the latest insights of the neuro-cognitive sciences into theories of how and why 
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consciousness is reconceived as the awareness of attention states. The interdisciplinary field 
of cultural studies serves to unite critical theory with cognitive theories around meaning-
making, which are framed as both sociocultural and cognitive processes. 
Every academic discipline has its own theoretical demarcations, each with its own focus in 
making meaning of data deemed worthy of expression, memory and explanation. In parallel, 
every discipline has its historical ontology, built through complex sets of both sudden insights 
and discoveries, and gradual discursive formations, aggregated by abstract categorisation over 
time – rough models of privileged memory. In the approach used in this study, I use “meaning-
making” as the focus for multidisciplinary syntheses but, as is made clear in Chapter 2.2, 
meaning-making is a subset of a larger process of mental model-building or schema.  
Turning to an applicable paradigm, the field of cultural studies is historically rooted in a 
sociological approach and focuses its theoretical concerns on societal and group categories. It 
has done so because of the dearth of convincing objective knowledge pertaining to the 
working of the minds of individuals. Informed by the criteria established by historically 
materialist theories of social science, it shelves this responsibility, thereby delegating a very 
basic building block in understanding to psychology and that domain’s historically cultural 
variants. The same, very broadly speaking, applies to discourse analysis which, although 
concerning itself with texts produced by individuals, situates them in broad societal processes. 
Again, literary criticism, with its concern about individual texts, individual artists and their 
bodies of work, follows the same pattern. 
Conversely, psychology has concerned itself with the individual, branching out later to the 
dynamics of initially small groups until (with the help of statistical models and sociology) it 
can make claims about larger societal formations and their behaviours. However, with recent 
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(and sudden, historically speaking) advances in cognitive scientific knowledge brought about 
by technical processes, such as electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and the like, this process of evolution in these historical paradigms 
has begun to traverse and transcend exclusive intellectual barriers by birthing new disciplines 
and building bridges between old, seemingly intransigent ones. In this context, this study 
makes the broad claim that meaning-making is both a cognitive process subject to physiology 
and a social process subject to historical discourse, constructed by a continuous process of 
contestation between residual, dominant and emerging ideologies.  
Stuart Hall (1983: 50) points to similar differentials based on prior ideological positioning: 
… But both residual and emergent cultural forms are important, not only in 
constituting moments of contestation with and resistance to the dominant cultural 
forms, but also in constituting the ongoing process by which the dominant cultural 
forms are able to change and adapt to new circumstances precisely by incorporating 
such residual and emergent forms (e.g., think of the first time that hippies appear on 
the cover of Time magazine).  
Teun Van Dijk (1995) speaks of the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion of dominant and 
emergent cultural forms in respect of othering, whilst Michael Graziano (2011) elaborates on 
the role of mental models of the self and of others as a basic function of the self. These 
linkages in theory are further unpacked in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study but here each prong 
increases understanding of polysemy in Avatar and lends weight to the validity of a multi-
disciplinary approach to its understanding. As such, this mixed toolset is prevalent throughout 
this study, but the weight of the arguments’ reliance on each set of theories shifts across the 
chapters. For example, in order to understand the meaning-making options Avatar provides 
for empathic response, the study benefits from the descriptive power of a discourse analysis 
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of the text itself to lay bare the nitty gritty of semiotic exchanges between the film’s characters 
and between their worlds. 
As art historians, interested in meaning at the point of production and reception, an analysis 
of meaning-making needs to uncover all the often-hidden elements of the artefact’s 
construction to proceed with the task of placing the film in its historically defining context. 
By revealing the ways in which the film represents, in this instance, Hollywood’s commitment 
to power inequalities, status quo interests and market values, and how these inform Avatar 
audiences’ meaning-making, the pressures brought to bear on individual artists’ creative 
output and their accompanying social and historical responsibilities can be more clearly 
appreciated.  
An analysis informed by deeper understandings of cognitive processes can reveal more of 
how these subtly coercive forces work. It follows then, that the success of this particular study 
can be qualitatively assessed by the degree to which it reconciles the dichotomy of culture 
and cognition in a unitary, plausible representation of the recent interest in a newly conceived 
field of “cognitive cultural studies” (Zunshine, 2010). 
1.11 Research Methodology 
This study accepts that the cognitive turn in film theory and literary and cultural criticism is 
well established and that what is contested is not its fact but the forms in which cognitive 
studies interact with social scientific methodologies. In other words, in this case, the study 
applies cognitive insights, neither unquestioningly nor speculatively but critically, asking how 
best to approach these new insights in their interactions with critical traditions in the arts. The 
study is, by its nature, qualitative although it does rely extensively on quantitative data from 
the cognitive sciences derived from theories that deploy scientific methods of observation, 
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research, hypothesis, data records, conclusions and replication, and their variants 
(Ramachandran; 1998, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2011,  Hogan; 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, Graziano; 2011, 2015, 2017, 2019, et al). 
Following the cultural materialism introduced by Williams (1961, 1977) and taken further by 
Hall (1973, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1996, 1997, 2001) the study uses, as its method, the systematic 
identification of ideological phenomena present in a cultural object such as a film. Early 
cultural studies theorists21 held that vocabularies22 give an appearance of stability when used 
in a cultural artefact and inequalities in power, and representation can be identified by 
historical shifts in word usage and meaning. Tracing the vocabularies that give each moment 
an appearance of stability, Williams was able to reveal the combinations of word usage 
serving as indicators of the contradictions at work within societies. These insights continue to 
be shared by theorists like Noel Chomsky23, Herman; 2007, 2013, Fairclough; 1992a, 1992b, 
1995, 2001, 2003, 2014, van Dijk; 1995, et al. 
While “conducting properly controlled experiments” is not the appropriate method for this 
study, I am guided by explanations that include: 
[t]he total set of details of heterophenomenology, plus all the data we can gather 
about concurrent events in the brains of subjects and in the surrounding 
environment, comprise the total data set for a theory of human consciousness. It 
 
21 The early cultural studies roots also situated in the literary criticism and semiotics of Barthes and Saussure, 
amongst others, and cultural studies theorists like Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, Stuart Hall, E. P. 
Thompson, David Morley et al. were influenced most powerfully by seeing language (and texts) as cultural 
artefacts created in the service of power, or as resistance to it.  
22 In the broad sense of media literacy. 
23 Although Noel Chomsky’s work in linguistics both preceded and succeeded William’s.  
I have admittedly read only a very brief selection of Chomsky’s vast output, much of which I found too complex 
to comprehend with my lack of grounding in linguistics. 
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leaves out no objective phenomena and no subjective phenomena of consciousness 
(Dennett, 2003: 20). 
Cultural studies theorists employ models of a circuit of culture (Du Gay, Janes, Mackay & 
Negus; 1997, Hall; 1973, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1996, 1997, 2001) as a methodological 
framework when examining a cultural artefact and the multi-dimensional representation of all 
its aspects. With the cognitive dimension factored in, the circuit could be reconceived with 
cognition24 as the enabling additional element, depicted in this diagram: 
 Modified from Du Gay et al.(1997) 
24 In the broad sense of intelligent systems, including animal and artificial. 
Figure 1: Circuit of culture 
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1.12 Ethics 
While there are no ethical considerations in respect to human participation in this research 
(since there has not been any field research), all research requires ethical formulations, and 
these have been observed. There have been no personal interviews conducted. In answering 
the “so what” interrogation of academic research, I maintain that this research is relevant 
academically, socially and artistically as it amplifies empathy in the structure of social 
communication in general and artistic expression specifically. 
1.13 Argument and chapter and outline 
Polysemic, often contradictory and even paradoxical ranges of meaning-making by Avatar 
audiences are revealed in media responses to the film. A cogent argument is made that the 
analysis of those responses necessitates the use of cognitively oriented models of explanation. 
These originate very broadly in biology and, more specifically, in neuroscience, cognitive 
narratology and certain conceptions of critical discourse theory. These are collectively 
adapted as a fresh approach to cultural studies and contribute to the project of reimagining the 
field as cognitive cultural studies.  
Foregrounding the research foci choices made in this study, literature on cognitive narratology 
is explored in Chapter 2.1 to harness the thought of Hogan; 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, Buckland; 2000; Casagrande; 2004; De Borst & De Gelder, 
2015; Herman; 2007, 2013 and others, for the purposes of understanding meaning-making in 
fiction. 
Providing challenges to narratives that take as their rationale and value the development of 
human consciousness requires an additional approach. Chapter 2.2 explores the considered 
engagement with the literature on mental models that may give rise to further, in-depth 
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comprehensive findings on polysemy. The relevance of cognitive neuroscience and its 
relationship to understanding polysemy is broadened to other frameworks of Avatar’s 
narratives. Networks, neuro-technology and neuro-marketing are shown for their innovative 
and creative relevance to meaning-making in emerging production cultures of the fictional 
film industry. 
Chapter 2.3 makes the case that debates of the responsibility of academics and artists in both 
their individual and social capacities are greatly enhanced through the lens of attention schema 
theory. The argument is made that the scholarship itself indicates the power discursive 
formations have in influencing meaning-making of cultural artefacts, in this context, exercised 
by many academics themselves. 
This is accomplished by structuring an argument based on a discourse analysis of the text 
across Chapters 2 and 3 that places attention schema theory (Graziano; 2011, 2015, 2017, 
2019) at the centre of discussions of an analysis of Avatar and, by extension, at the heart of 
cognitive cultural studies. To do so, Chapter 2 interrogates attention schema theory for its 
value in providing insight into a theory of mind employed by humans in making meaning by 
showing how that process relates to the construction of self. Graziano’s theories (2011, 2015, 
2017, 2019) are applied to an analysis of how attention is deployed in Avatar.  
Analyses of Avatar are extended in Chapter 3 with the additional specificity of empathy. This 
is partly due to constantly emerging understandings in the research process but also because 
the preceding chapters lay the groundwork for completing the analysis. Hogan; 1999, 2001, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, Boyd; 2005, 2009, Fairclough; 1992a, 
1992b, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2014, and Van Dijk; 1995, are used extensively in these chapters 
but broad understandings that provide for a more complete analysis of Avatar are found in 
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fields of study not necessarily covered by an exclusively critical discourse analysis. Therefore, 
these chapters provide the case study specificity required to demonstrate the arguments 
around the use of attention and empathy in meaning-making in Avatar and the overarching 
project of the work to put the “cognitive” back into cultural studies.  
The conclusion, Chapter 5, collates and evaluates the findings relating to the central problem 
of the study which is an explanation of Avatar’s achievement in offering a successfully 
polysemic meaning-making experience for the audience, despite, or perhaps because of, the 
many contradictions. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature, as part of the research matter of this project, has been chosen across three 
modalities: through the lens of cognitive attention schema theory, insights of narrative and of 
consciousness are selected and through the lens of indigeneity, identity and exclusion, 
empathy is explored. Literature specific to case studies of Avatar is spread across all three 
sections. Conclusions drawn from these bodies of literature are then presented in the form of 
findings at the end Chapter 2. 
2.2 Cognitive attention schema theory: Mechanics of narrative 
The aim of this section is to outline the literature relevant to the topics of discourse (Foucault, 
1972; 1983), meaning-making (Hall, 1974; 1980; 1997; 2001) and the narratology, cultural 
stereotyping and framing of the exotic other in the context of cross-disciplinary cultural 
criticism (Alessio & Meredith, 2012; Anderson, 2009; Madzoski, 2013; Hughey, 2014; 
Hogan; 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, Schuller; 2013; 
Tisucká; 2014). To effect this process of synthesis, the relevance of cognitive neuroscience 
and its relationship to understanding storytelling is explored. In other words, narratives and 
their relationship to networks, neuro-tech and neuro-marketing are investigated for their 
relevance to meaning-making in the fictional film industry.  
Cognitive narratology is explored here to harness the thoughts of Hogan (1999, 2001, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015), Buckland (2000), Casagrande (2004), De Borst 
& De Gelder (2015), Herman (2007, 2013), and others. This chapter discusses the framing 
and scholarship pertaining to this broad thread of thought and its relevance to an analysis of 
Avatar. Therefore, this section situates recent research developments in the fields of 
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narratology, literary and discourse criticism informed by advances in biological sciences, 
arguing for the state of knowledge of the brain and its evolutionary, personal/subjective and 
social mechanisms as a theoretical juncture. But culture remains the central focus of this 
theoretical synthesis. 
Many diverse theoretical approaches apply to the notion that the mind’s functioning is 
intimately connected to the body and they all acknowledge the biological underpinnings 
of culture. They include the “naturalistic explanation of culture” (Sperber, 1996), the 
“biocultural approach” to cultural texts and objects (Boyd; 2009, Krajewska; 2014), the 
“cognitive turn in humanities” (Richardson, 2010) and the “cognitive cultural interplay” 
(Zunshine, 2006; 2010). The key insight in these approaches to the analysis of cultural 
texts and objects is that culture arises out of the particular capacity of human cognition 
to innovate technologically, to think symbolically, and to record and reflect; therefore 
impacting on how the humanities approach culture and biology (Krajewska, 2014: 59). 
To this effect, Krajewska (2014: 36) summarises the work of Boyd (2009) and Richardson 
(2005) thus: 
1. Culture is information that people acquire from others by teaching, imitation, and 
other forms of social learning. 2. Culture change should be modelled as a Darwinian 
evolutionary. 3. Culture is part of human biology. 4. Culture makes human evolution 
very different from the evolution of other organisms. 5. Genes and culture co-evolve.  
Not only does Krajewska trace a clear ontology between biology and culture, but she indicates 
ways in which scholars are breaking down mental processes as behaviours:25 
 
25 See Graziano (2017).  
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The biocultural approach targets the essence of life management as an adaptive 
organisation of a variety of behaviours. These behaviours include such strategies as 
problem solving, provision of access to resources, reproduction and status seeking, 
and are fundamental in biology and therefore in culture too. The debates about the 
compatibility of the humanities and sciences are rendered marginal when culture is 
revealed as having a biological centre (Krajewska, 2014: 27).  
Therefore, in the theoretical approach taken in this study, a conscious attempt is made to 
collapse (or cross-pollinate) the traditional divisions in biology knowledge systems and theory 
dealing with culture. As David Herman advises, what is required to transcend binaries of 
“legible and illegible animal minds”26 is the development of  
techniques for documenting and analysing the attested range of mind-ascribing 
practices in a given culture or subculture, as they manifest themselves in non-
fictional as well as fictional narratives anchored in a variety of ‘discourse domains’ 
(Herman, 2017). 
Using discourse domains in the sense of the frameworks needed to “determine what sorts of 
ascriptive practices will be governed by norms that cut across the fiction/non-fiction 
distinction” (Herman, 2017: 196), Herman argues that mind-ascription acts always manifest 
within particular areas of practice or discourse domains and that such domains then 
“determine when, to what extent, and in what manner it is appropriate and warranted to impute 
subjective experiences to others, non-human as well as human” (Herman 2017: 197). Avatar 
is, amongst other categorisations, an animated CGI film and, as Sean Cubitt argues, 
26 Particularly poignant in Avatar. 
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considering the utopian dimension of CGI animation:  
(b)reaking coherence, presenting the non-identity of the image, is not necessarily or 
only a sign of failure. It is in the interstices between layers that the imagination is 
freed to explore Pandora as a possible world: to think, even briefly, against Leibniz, 
that not our Earth but Pandora is ‘the best of all possible worlds’ …. Animation does 
not share this need to reconcile opposites, as almost any Donald Duck cartoon 
demonstrates. There remains in animation the possibility that the tear in the heart, 
the fault in reality, the rifts in the social are not reconcilable, but equally that worlds 
can be generated in which those features operate differently (Cubitt, 2012: 230).  
Applied to Avatar, Cubitt’s observation points to Cameron’s very modest and pragmatic view 
on social change and the attitudes likely to give rise to that change; a view that recognises that 
current social divisions are polarised and that the best an author can hope for is a small, often 
temporary shift in audience identities.  
Fairclough, formative in respect of developing critical discourse analysis (CDA) in the critical 
realist tradition (Fairclough, 1998; 2003), combines insights from Williams on the irreducible 
element of textual semiosis in all aspects of social reality, with the ideological concerns of 
Foucault’s discourse analysis and Hall’s insights on representation. A text, in Fairclough’s 
(1992: 3) view, is 
[a]ny product whether written or spoken, so that the transcript of an interview or a 
conversation, for example, would be called a ‘text’, [But] it is quite appropriate to 
extend the notion of discourse to cover other symbolic forces such as visual images, 
and texts which are combinations of words and images.  
Furthermore, Fairclough & Fairclough (2012: 465) see texts as historical moments and 
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identifies those texts important for critical discourse analysis research, as more than: 
just representations and imaginaries; to having transformative effects on social 
reality, being operationalised – enacted as new ways of (inter)acting, inculcated in 
new ways of being (identities), materialized in new instruments and techniques of 
production or ways of organizing space.  
Similarly, Avatar was conceived in the hope that its messages would shift audience 
perspectives and change attitudes. The analysis concentrates on identifying scenes in the film 
which show the use and reference to the cognitive sciences and their relationship to 
ideological discourse. Since Cameron makes claims to an artistic transformative agenda, it 
becomes crucial to understand the way attention is deployed. In this way, the research explains 
some of the assumptions behind the framing of this study (explicitly in its title), regarding 
Avatar as a process of colonisation through the appropriation of attention, technically and 
discursively; Cameron colonises27 popular conceptions of neuroscience similarly to how he 
colonises anthropology.28  
The analysis therefore provides the insight that, for a commercial industry on the cusp of 
constant technological innovation, he models the medium in a powerfully immersive way, 
thereby (again) colonising it on a representational level. More detail of this part of the research 
is found in Chapter 3 which deals with the competition for attention required for an immersive 
experience of the film. 
 
27 The term is used here in a loose way indicating broad actions of appropriating possession of a domain, 
but is also meant to reflect the study’s concern with indigeneity. 
28 “In its use or misuse of anthropological methods, this film contains the desire of caging anthropology the 
way we are used to it being, preventing any possibility for it to change” (Madzoski, 2013). 
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The research data collection process included not only accessing the transcript of the film and 
digitised clips of pertinent aspects of Avatar, with its extra scenes (and its transmedia use) but 
includes interviews with Cameron where what he says about the production can similarly be 
captured and interrogated. These are a result of researching available online resources and 
from the extended collector’s DVD edition of Avatar. No new interviews have been 
undertaken in this research. Regarding the method of interpretation of data, the use in this 
study of heterophenomenology requires the researcher to accept the spoken words of an actor 
at surface value but, as Daniel Dennett cautions:  
exploiting linguistic communication in this way, you get a fine window into the 
subject’s subjectivity but at the cost of a peculiar lapse in normal interpersonal 
relations. You reserve judgment about whether the subject’s beliefs, as expressed in 
their communication, are true, or even well-grounded, but then you treat them as 
constitutive of that subject’s subjectivity. To put it fancifully, suppose you burst into 
my heterophenomenology lab to warn me that the building is on fire. I don’t leap to 
my feet and head for the door; I write down ‘subject S believes the building is on 
fire’. ‘No, really, it’s on fire!’ you insist, and I ask ‘Would you like to expand on that? 
What is it like for you to think the building is on fire?’ and so forth. In one way I am 
taking you as seriously as you could ever hope to be taken, but in another way I am 
not. I am not assuming that you are right in what you tell me, but just that that is 
what you do believe (Dennett, 2003: 23). 
There is a tension then between what Dennett calls “first person” and “second person” science 
in terms of what one might call “authenticity”, but this is a tension I, as a researcher, am 
prepared to tread, since 
[i]t has always been good practice for scientists to put themselves in their own 
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experimental apparatus as informal subjects, to confirm their hunches about what it 
feels like, and to check for any overlooked or underestimated features of the 
circumstances that could interfere with their interpretations of their experiments. But 
scientists have always recognized the need to confirm the insights they have gained 
from introspection by conducting properly controlled experiments with naive 
subjects. As long as this obligation is met, whatever insights one may garner from 
‘first-person’ investigations fall happily into place in ‘third-person’ 
heterophenomenology (Dennett, 2003: 23). 
Before turning our attention to the mechanics of consciousness, this section highlights the 
point that a systematic approach to the mechanics of narrative involves an interplay with 
universal species-enacted cognition and historical discursive specificity, with culture being 
the preeminent category for that specificity. A systematic approach to a narratival approach 
to the analysis of texts likewise mitigates against inherent subjectivities in all29 meaning-
making but, rather than achieving objectivity, it corroborates evidence in support of particular 
discourses. The onus thus falls in the success of a multi-disciplinary corroboration30 of the 
explanatory power of its analysis.     
2.3 Cognitive attention schema theory: Mechanics of consciousness  
One of the key insights from cognitive science, in its firmly established contribution to the 
epistemologies of the arts, social sciences and humanities, is that the processes around the 
construction of the self or the mind/body binary are adapted by the evolutionary biology of 
our species (Boyd, 2009; Krajewska, 2014; Kurzweil, 2005; Stone-Blackburn, 1993). As 
 
29 i.e., consumer and analyst consumption of artefacts.  
30 More accurately, “synthesis”. 
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these constructions are articulated (in the sense used by Hall [1996])31 in cultural practice, the 
construction of the self is now quantifiable to a much greater extent, in the sense of 
reproducible, formal, scientific (often medical) and mathematical criteria. Advances in 
neuroscience (Graziano, 2013; 2016) and cognitive analytic psychology show, for example, 
that the nature of the self can be described mechanistically as an “awareness” (Graziano, 2013; 
2016) of the brain’s own functioning, specifically in the process of being aware of our 
subjective states of attention. This process of being aware of our attention is strung into a 
semblance of personal identity for purely strategic reasons, which is to say as evolutionary 
survival-oriented functions, stored in our memory. The attention schema theory starts (and 
ends) with evolution: 
In this theory, consciousness emerged first with a specific function related to the 
control of attention and continues to evolve and expand its cognitive role (Graziano, 
2013: ii). 
Briefly taking a very broad philosophic view, traditionally, consciousness has been a mystery, 
and nothing indicates the actual state of our evolution as a species more than this fundamental 
lack of conscious insight. The converse applies; if we are to survive as a species, knowledge 
of the workings of consciousness is imperative. But, as Krajewska cautions, alluding to the 
elusive nature of knowing consciousness: 
The problem is that most of the ‘knowledge’ about consciousness (and there are 
31 “Articulation was always used by Hall in a double sense – referring, on the one hand, to expressing or giving 
voice while, on the other, to making connections (like the cab and trailer of an articulated lorry). Although 
cultural studies (and the critics of cultural studies) have tended to focus attention on the first of these – the 
ideological, discursive, symbolic practices of articulation – Hall never forgot that hegemony was also the site of 
the second type of articulatory work.” (John Clarke, 2014. Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical 
Anthropology 70, 2014; 119). 
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thousands of publications on this subject) is mostly speculation with better or worse 
arguments put forth by some scientists/thinkers.32  
Thus far, humanity has only obliquely been able to grasp at this knowledge through ritual, 
speculation and science, the latter being considerably assisted by medical observation and 
correlation. This is not to say that consciousness is fundamentally unknowable; it is to counter 
the sometimes-extraordinary claims made by early thinkers, based on the very human feeling 
of needing cognitive certainty. But, as Michael Gazzaniga chronicles in his “eyebrow 
wiggling” style,33 consciousness is subject to evolution that he traces over the last 2,500 years. 
My own attempt will not be remotely as exhaustive. It attempts merely to place neuroscience 
in a philosophical context, taking up ideas important to this analysis’ interest in cognitive 
cultural studies.  
Taking a neuroscientific view of history, and including philosophers in that framing, 
Gazzaniga posits a Western development track that starts with ancient Egyptians and 
Mesopotamians with an assumed sort of unified single consciousness, where people thought 
of the natural world in the same terms as Gazzaniga (2018: 13) thought of “himself and other 
men [sic]. The natural world had thoughts, desires, and emotions, just like humans”. 
Gazzaniga makes the further assumption therefore that the consciousness of humans and 
nature were inseparable and did not have to be understood in cognitively different ways 
(Gazzaniga, 2018). 
Moving from this assumption of a unified single consciousness in prehistory to the Greeks’ 
 
32 Personal email Fri, 31 May, 10:59, 2019  
33 See Gazzaniga’s (2018:68) meaning of “eyebrow wiggling” and the anecdotal literary style his writing 
assumes. 
44 
advance in consciousness as differentiating and dissecting an outside separate, physical world, 
Gazzaniga isolates one devastatingly destructive cognitive pattern that continues to this day, 
taking its toll on our understanding of biology and the nature of the rational mind specifically, 
and is worth referencing here to unpack the complexity of the paradox he is referring to: 
The scientific method as practiced today is a formal system in which a hypothesis 
produces its inferences, that is, its effects: the hypothesis entails its effects. Another 
way to say this is that the cause comes before the effect. This presents a problem 
when asking Aristotle’s final-causation ‘why’ question. Let’s go back to ‘Why the 
cart, Aristotle?’ Why did Aristotle have a cart parked in front of his home when hours 
earlier it had been parked at Acropolis Depot? He had seen the cart (which entailed 
the effects of the material, formal, and efficient causes) and wanted it. Here, the 
tables were turned and the effect came before the cause. This is a no-no in the 
Newtonian world, where a state can only entail subsequent states. Thus, Aristotle’s 
final causation, as a separate category, was lost to science (Gazzaniga, 2018: 15-
16). 
For this study, the fact that a mind is conceived as logically unable to set in motion its own 
volition and self-reflection, and therefore its own understanding of itself, has had profound 
implications for the evolution of the theory of mind processes. The linear conception of brain 
states as resulting from causes rather than the understanding that effects can also set cognitive 
action in motion was compounded by Descartes. This has splintered philosophy into forms of 
Cartesian dualism that bedevil us still today: 
On the road to the present, Descartes boldly separated the immortal soul (and, with 
it, the mind) from the mechanistic universe and mechanistic body. With the mind and 
flesh considered separate, the mind became the central puzzle; it was deemed 
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immaterial, indubitable, infallible, and immutable. By promoting the mind to 
supernatural status, Descartes took it off the table as an object of scientific study. 
Descartes could never explain how this immaterial mind interacted with the material 
body, but his theory profoundly gummed up the thinking about the physical reality of 
the mind for more than two hundred years (Gazzaniga, 2018: 27-28). 
Gazzaniga turns to the British for his next stage in the history of consciousness, where 
philosophers were often physicists (and children of religion)34 who made considerable 
advances in the dissection of the body and developed a complementary cognitive strategy – 
that of empiricism, a process started by the Greeks, institutionalised by Galen, abandoned by 
Descartes, fashioned into scientific inquiry by Locke,35 and honed by Hume, leading 
eventually to Darwin’s game-changing insights. Locke, says Gazzaniga (2018: 37) saw 
consciousness as “the glue that binds one’s story together into one’s sense of self, one’s 
personal identity”, a valuable insight in its pre-empting of theories of mental schemation. 
Locke believed that consciousness facilitates personal memory but while he agreed with 
Descartes that humans have free will, he resorted to metaphysics to explain how matter could 
produce mind.  
Gazzaniga quotes Darwin, saying Darwin separated himself from the mind/body dualists 
when he wrote:  
In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology 
 
34 “The scientists were children of religion. Their new scientific knowledge of the world conflicted with their 
heartfelt childhood religious beliefs. They were experiencing what is now known as cognitive dissonance, the 
mental discomfort one feels when simultaneously holding two or more contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values. 
As a result, to reduce this discomfort, people try to explain or justify the conflict, or instead they actually change 
their beliefs” (Gazzaniga, 2018: 30). 
35 We will see later how this was an important idea for the growth of a narratival approach to psychology and a 
cognitive approach to cultural studies and literary criticism. 
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will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental 
power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his 
history (Darwin, 1860: 424 cited in Gazzaniga, 2018). 
Drawing on a trajectory between Freud who, says Gazzaniga, only has value for realising that 
most human cognitive processes are unconscious36 and those German thinkers who 
strengthened the narratival conception of the self, Gazzaniga points to another moment of 
interest for this research: 
Schopenhauer puts the intellect in the backseat. It isn’t the driver of behavior and 
also isn’t privy to the will’s decisions; it’s just an after-hours spokesperson, making 
up stories as it goes along to explain ex post facto what the will has wrought 
(Gazzaniga, 2018: 46).37 
The trajectory in understandings from Locke to Schopenhauer mirrors Gazzaniga’s own 
conception of the mind as unconscious, non-linear, decentralised thinking likening it to a pot 
of bubbling water, each bubble having momentary existence, and each being replaced by 
stronger signals from the brain. Gazzaniga invites us to consider that consciousness may be 
understood “only as the brain’s bubbles, each with its own hardware to close the gap, getting 
its moment” (Gazzaniga, 2018: 8).  
Not surprisingly, Gazzaniga ends with his own state of knowledge of the field as a layered 
conception of consciousness. What is of interest in Gazzaniga’s tale for this thesis, is its 
concern with rapid and emerging reconceptions of central human consciousness as multi-
 
36 “[Freud]’s original theories of psychopathology have not withstood close scrutiny and have generally been 
consigned to the trash bin” (Gazzaniga, 2018; 52). 
37 Schopenhauer also contributed the notion of “Zeitgeist” itself as a useful tool in later understandings of cultural 
studies and notions of hegemony, especially in the writings of Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971). 
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modal distributed awareness, suggesting an incremental historical process of understanding 
much more about the working of consciousness or, as I confine the term, attention. 
Gazzaniga highlights the valuable contributions made by the medical contexts in which 
research took place and still does, and how this has formed and firmed up a more scientifically 
robust field(s). This research has led to some observational axioms in the literature around the 
conflux of symptoms, in turn, leading to some convincing conclusions. For example, 
Gazzaniga, speaking about his own clinical observations in pathology wards, described 
consciousness: 
These patients with widely distributed brain lesions, a level of disruption vast enough 
to bring any computing machine to its knees, remain conscious. In one hospital room 
after another, each harboring a patient with a focal or a diffuse brain impairment, 
consciousness purrs along. After a tour of the wards, it begins to look like 
consciousness is not a system property at all. It is a property of local brain circuits 
(Gazzaniga, 2018: 6). 
In maintaining that the word “awareness” pertains similarly to the above example of 
consciousness, I move towards a position where consciousness ceases to have the specificity 
in meaning required to describe it rigorously. This slippage between the words denotes the 
unfixedness of the terms and their continuing mystery, but awareness can be qualitatively and 
quantitatively measured in different states at differing frequencies, whereas consciousness 
suggests a subjective, homogenous and therefore illusory “Cloud of Unknowing”.38 Michael 
Graziano echoes Gazzaniga in demonstrating the increasing obsolescence of the term, 
38 This refers to the continuing religiosity which the notion of consciousness enjoys 
(https://www.catholicspiritualdirection.org/cloudunknowing.pdf). 
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“consciousness”: 
Since socially impaired people appear to be conscious and can report that they are 
conscious in much the same way that anyone else does, the evidence is against the 
theory that social capacity is the source of consciousness. The fundamental difficulty 
here is that the social theories of consciousness are too general. They imply that 
awareness arises from any and all social thinking. They predict a sweeping 
correlation between all social ability and awareness. The attention schema theory of 
consciousness avoids this difficulty because it does not suffer from overgenerality. It 
is much more specific. In it, awareness depends on one specific function, an ability 
to reconstruct, describe, or model the process of attention. It is not the ‘social 
schema’ theory but specifically the ‘attention schema’ theory. A person could be 
socially impaired in half a dozen ways and have no loss of awareness (Graziano, 
2013: 128-129). 
But attention itself is not a homogenous process and there are some important disjunctures 
associated with different forms of awareness and what is often called “top-down” versus 
“bottom-up” impulses: 
The ‘neocortex’ is the outermost region of the brain and the most recently developed 
in evolution. Roughly speaking, the subcortex has motivational and homeostatic 
functions (e.g., governing thirst). Thus, emotions such as anger are largely a function 
of subcortical regions. The neocortex is responsible for perception and motion, as 
well as the integration of information from different sense modalities. The isolation 
of emotional and information processing functions has fairly obvious importance for 
literature and the arts (Hogan & Aldama, 2014: 294).  
Although stimuli may arrive at the subcortical and neocortical areas of the brain almost 
49 
simultaneously, emotional processing appears to be faster than “the fuller perceptual 
processing” (Hogan & Aldama, 2014: 293) originating in the neocortical areas and may be 
mediated by those areas. For example, in 3D, a common film-making device is to seemingly 
throw filmic artefacts at the audience, via the depth of perception illusion that 3D consists of, 
to the extent that audiences involuntarily duck their heads. But the audience knows a split 
second later that it was just an illusion and is more prepared for that effect when it is repeated. 
In other words, neocortical processing may lead to mediation of the subcortical response. 
Likewise, it is conceivable that this may work in reverse too; the storyteller may use fear to 
surprise audiences out of their quiet reverie created by the ebb and flow of the story, in order 
to heighten emotional response and excitement. As Hogan (2014: 293) explains: 
Task contradictions and complex interactions between neocortical and subcortical 
responses are pervasive in literary response. Understanding them should further our 
understanding of literary reception.  
Since brain (and other) cells may be either excitatory or inhibitory, neural circuits activate in 
sequence, likewise exciting or inhibiting neighbouring circuits. Again, this may have 
“significant consequences for our conception of mental operation in literary creation, 
representation, and response” (Hogan, 2014: 295). Practically, this has implications for how 
authors structure information in their texts, in the attention we are able to pay to the storyline, 
in the responses the story arc elicits, in the emotional response it produces and (in a film) the 
properly coordinated visual and auditory cues of the medium itself. As a result of these 
neurological dynamics, information is not static or fixed in the brain, being more of an 
ongoing and presumably multi-levelled competition for signal strength and durability. This 
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primary neurological mechanism forms a basic building block of neuroplasticity,39 indicating 
a fluid process of experience that, in turn, seems to me to potentially provide some 
physiological basis for post-modern conceptions of meaning-making. Tangibly, an audience 
member may have made meaning of something in one instant (or over time) which is 
overturned in the next.40 These mechanisms may be similarly implicated in ontological 
experiences of objectivity and subjectivity, but this ramification may be too broad to deal with 
in this study, beyond this note.  
Laying the foundation to Graziano’s (later) theoretical collapse of the popularly experienced 
self, the work of Ramachandran is worth articulating at length in the following anecdote on 
the challenges of unravelling consciousness: 
The reason this is so hard to study is because it is inherently subjective. ‘The first 
person singular does not exist in the physical world,’ (Ramachandran) says. ‘It’s a 
ghost.’ He calls this the ‘vantage point problem’. People who experience such 
dramatic differences in perception may be rare, but we are all capable of distorting 
our sense of self. ‘A simple experiment can show how. Try looking at yourself in a 
double-reflecting mirror – two mirrors facing each other such that the second reflects 
the image in the first. Then raise your right arm. The first reflection is a normal 
mirror image, but the second is inversed, which we are not used to seeing. So, when 
you raise your right hand, it raises its right hand. It’s a doppelganger, miming your 
behaviour,’ Ramachandran says. Keep looking and something odd can happen to 
39 First explored by Michael Merzenich who initially set out to prove that brain parts are discrete and functionally 
specified, the opposite of his findings on neuroplasticity (Merzenich & Jenkins, 1995).  
40 “(c)ognitive dissonance, the mental discomfort one feels when simultaneously holding two or more 
contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values. As a result, to reduce this discomfort, people try to explain or justify the 
conflict, or instead they actually change their beliefs.” (Gazzaniga, 2018: 30). It is difficult to see how they could 
do so without neuroplasticity. 
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your sense of self. ‘You start experiencing that you are out there.’ What’s more, if 
you watch your arm moving in the second mirror, you may see a slight delay. As 
Ramachandran puts it, it’s slowed down as if your hand is moving through treacle. 
Exactly why this happens is something he and his team are working on, but we know 
that neurons in your brain telling your hand to move fire milliseconds before you 
consciously decide to move it. To avoid the sensation of being a puppet, your brain 
smoothes things out so that everything feels simultaneous. 
Ramachandran suspects that when you see this doppelganger in the mirror, your 
brain doesn’t compute it as you – so the correction isn’t applied. In essence, you are 
seeing the unconscious machinery of the brain laid bare (De Lange, 2017). 
Most theories of consciousness are magical, says Graziano, in two ways: how awareness 
emerges from the brain is unexplained and how awareness controls the brain is unexplained: 
This problem of double magic disappears if awareness is information. The brain is, 
after all, an information-processing device. For an information-processing device to 
report that it has inner, subjective experience, it must contain within it information 
to that effect. The cognitive machinery can then access that information, read it, 
summarize it linguistically, and provide a verbal report to the outside world 
(Graziano, 2013: 19). 
Attention schema theory is almost shockingly mechanistic and even emotionally disturbing 
for some. Because its main claim is an understanding of the working of human awareness, the 
construction of which has direct bearing on meaning-making at the point of awareness, i.e. at 
the point of consumption of a cultural artefact, this study takes it as central to understanding 
Avatar audience response. Graziano acknowledges the personal discomfiture in this shift in 
existential awareness accompanying this knowledge: 
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This approach is deeply unsatisfying – which does not argue against it. A theory does 
not need to be satisfying to be true. The approach is unsatisfying partly because it 
takes away some of the magic. It says, in effect, there is no subjective feeling inside, 
at least not quite as people have typically imagined it. Instead, there is a description 
of having a feeling and a computed certainty that the description is accurate and not 
merely a description. The brain, accessing that information, can then act in the ways 
that we know people to act – it can decide that it has a subjective feeling, and it can 
talk about the subjective feeling (Graziano, 2013: 20-21). 
A theory of mind would appear to be a basic first block in reading the meaning-making of 
that mind, but understandings of this primary unit of consciousness have been elusive, 
especially in its empirical representations, and the purvey only of weighty philosophical 
attempts, for millennia: 
Because we normally acquire theory of mind so effortlessly, we cease to notice 
anything to master. We assume that we simply see situations as they are (Boyd, 2009: 
143). 
In other words, habituation and internalisation of those learning dynamics involved in the 
ordinary, day-to-day upkeep of the theory of mind41 processes over time, are done 
automatically. Specifically, the mental models underpinning our sense of self no longer 
demand conscious attention. Consequently, the attention required to question and revise long-
standing mental models feels like a waste of energy. But, in the consumption of a cultural 
artefact, 
41 Not in the sense of a theory of how the mind works but the implicit process of attributing awareness to others 
and building mental models of their thoughts, feelings and future actions (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). 
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… mental states have implications for what processing traces are available in 
memory and how this information is used in reconstruction. Further, the mind 
supplements textual information with extra-textual input, and confuses what is in the 
text with what is not. Readers notice what is of interest or relevant to them, filter out 
what is not, and can draw unpredictable connections. In other words, we process 
literature in terms of how we interact with it. Each reader’s interaction is selective. 
A serious endorsement of these limitations of the real reader’s mind has extensive 
implications for the understanding of literary processing. Perhaps one of the most 
interesting is that aesthetic reaction is not to the text, but rather to readers’ mental 
representation in memory, and that this mental representation bears a pale 
resemblance to the original. What is produced in the reader’s mind can never, for 
any reader under any circumstances, be the equivalent of the text. Rather than 
bemoan this reality, as literary theorists might, we should instead recognize that it is 
that very outcome of the reading process – the mental representation – that makes 
literature memorable: Readers interact with the text, bringing themselves to it, so 
that the product of their processing is a unique combination of the objective and 
subjective, of the text and themselves (Bortolussi & Dixon, 2015: 46). 
When it comes to cognitive analysis, Hogan outlines as a standard cognitive scientific method, 
the need to 
… first define and examine our problem in terms of information processing. Second, 
we must articulate our analysis in terms of cognitive architecture only. Finally, we 
must develop our analyses as algorithmic sequences (Hogan, 2003: 31). 
In other words, Hogan defines the problem here in terms of information processing. Since the 
“isolation of emotional and information processing functions” (Hogan, 2003: 31) cannot, in 
this study, be situated in a grand theory of consciousness, as Hogan attempts to do, this section 
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deals primarily with consciousness as awareness stemming from its information processing 
functions, leaving emotions for Chapter 2.4. But Hogan (2003: 30) notes that we need to 
formulate all our analyses, not only in terms of information processing, but also in terms of a 
well-specified cognitive architecture, made up of structures, contents and processes: 
Structures are the general organizational principles of the mind. For example, the 
distinction between working memory and long-term memory is a structural 
distinction. Structures define the relations into which processes and contents can 
enter. Indeed, they allow processes and contents to exist at all. Contents are most 
often understood as representations or symbols. Thus my idea of a cat or my internal 
lexical entry for ‘cat’ is a mental content. Contents have specific locations in 
structures. 
The basic idea here is that any cognitive scientific analysis should consist of a set of steps that 
is fully explicit in moving from inputs of the (information processing) problem to outputs. 
This sequence of steps should reference only structures, processes and contents available 
within the cognitive architecture. Finally, each step should be derived from the preceding step 
by the application of some specified process of the cognitive architecture. Put differently, 
insofar as the cognitive architecture may be implemented on a computer, says Hogan, the 
solution to the problem should be a program (or simulation model) that would run on the 
computer and would produce the right outputs, given the relevant inputs (Hogan, 2003: 31). 
The relevance of attention schema theory to the meaning-making of Avatar audiences is that 
it posits a process of mental model-construction, operating at many varied levels, in everyone. 
Meaning-making, in this sense, gives way to a larger, more explanatorily robust concept of 
model-building or, as Graziano (2011, 2015, 2017, 2019) terms it, mental schema. 
Henceforth, I will include the terms “schemating” and “schemation” for this process. I argue 
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that the formulations put forward by proponents of attention schema theory specifically 
(Graziano; 2017, Green; 2017), contribute to our understanding of meaning-making of a 
cultural product and the internal modelling that that process necessarily entails.  
Consider the example of the schemation opportunities in this still from Avatar’s narrative. In 
one of the opening scenes of the film this still frame shows a recently disabled Jake Sully on 
a crowded urban street, on Earth:  
Figure 1: Jake lost on crowded Earth street 
Taking as a reference point the meaning presented visually in this still, I understand our 
protagonist to be part of a social circumstance increasingly typical of my own planet’s future. 
Consequently, I have identified the visual meaning encoded in this frame. But, moving from 
knowledge of schemation, I understand that this frame triggers a process of interrogation or 
consolidation of my model of the future, and my subjective place in it. 
Meaning, in this context, can disclose my feelings about those models of the future, whereas 
the method of starting with meaning-making indicates only the meaning embedded visually 
in the frame. Additional information is required to discover the emotional impact of the frame 
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to establish whether emotion is present at all, for example, in accompanying dialogue or 
preceding contextual frames. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clip 33: Conditions on Earth 
The ability of larger concepts to explain smaller, constituent processes is useful for more than 
weighing up theories; at stake here is the explanatory power offered by a model of the mind 
claiming a precise understanding of the self (Graziano, 2013), surely the most pressing issue 
in all interpretative sciences. But another way of looking at this process is through the lens of 
“chunking”42 – conglomerating smaller pieces of information or data under constituent 
headings. A central concern in cognitive psychology, the idea that the brain chunks individual 
pieces of information together into a meaningful whole (Neath & Surprenant, 2003) has been 
extended to all levels of its cognitive schemation.  
In 1936, Piaget developed a cognitive learning theory to account for people (via children) 
mentally processing the information we receive and doing so with differing forms of attention 
associated with different development stages. He named schemas as the basic building blocks 
 
42 A term from cognitive psychology also now prevalent in computer science; one of many emerging syntactical 
cross-over concepts indicating the merging of cognitive and linguistic cultures. 
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of intelligent behaviour as: 
(a) cohesive, repeatable action sequence possessing component actions that are
tightly interconnected and governed by a core meaning (Piaget, 1952: 7). 
Moving to a more self-reflexive mode of inquiry, knowing how the constant awareness of my 
attention results in the conclusion that I am an entity and that the unity, previously known as 
the self, is really an information-handling model that impacts directly on my mental point of 
view – I may not be the solid self I imagine and feel I know I am; I may be a far more flexible, 
self-programmable set of processes under constant construction. Knowing that others are 
similarly under construction becomes key to understanding more than just my own experience 
and allows an introspective reflection on the work others produce and its consumption by 
audiences.  
As human attention is captured in newly immersive forms of media, such as 3D, VR and 
augmented reality (AR), the function of which draws increasingly on knowledge of the 
working and manipulation of the brain, so these technologies can be said43 to colonise44 
audience experience,45 to colonise attention, in an attempt to influence awareness and the 
cognitive content of that awareness. By providing stereotypical narratives, an alignment 
between mainstream social discourse and values is reinforced in Avatar since the constant 
bottom-up bombarding stimuli combination of 3D, fantastical scenery and mind-blowing 
43 This insight is nothing particular to audience studies however, I am referring here to the extensive critical 
tradition in general, grounded in forms of Marxist and historical materialist analysis. 
44 See, for example, Donna Haraway (1991): “Modern production seems like a dream of cyborg colonization 
work, a dream that makes the nightmare of Taylorism seem idyllic. And modern war is a cyborg orgy, coded by 
C3I, command-control-communication-intelligence, an $84 billion item in 1984’s US defense budget.”  
45 “In efforts to colonise the electronic frontier the material body is repressed and divorced from the locus of 
knowledge … the body, as a sense apparatus, is nothing more than excess baggage for the cyberspace traveler” 
(Balsamo, 1996: 125). 
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potential human rewards bound up in those sorts of scenarios in the film, compete for the 
attention left for a critical top-down understanding of the issues, if there are indeed issues. 
And Avatar abounds with issues. Arguably, the sum of which is the issue of our survival as a 
species, where Cameron subscribes to the general view of the Anthropocene as a final, 
cataclysmic epoch in human civilization. 
This is not an argument against using powerfully immersive technologies – it is evidence 
towards employing a more sophisticated, cognitively informed approach to mental 
schemation in the conception and analysis of cultural artefacts, to provide transformative 
capacity to narratives that take, as their rationale and value, the development of human 
consciousness. This process, I argue, is greatly enhanced by understanding the role of 
attention schema in meaning-making. 
We ascribe attention to other beings (and even to inanimate and imaginary objects) and, in so 
doing, imbue others with subjective experience. This begins the process of meaning-making. 
Preferred, oppositional and negotiated meanings (Hall, 1973) as a function of schemation 
likewise indicate the specificity required to identify Avatar’s schemating points of 
engagement, by identifying the historically-based discourses at work in both audiences and 
the film. Cultural studies concerns itself with matters of ideology and the concept of 
“discourse” which lies at the root of cultural studies analysis is seen as the main social vehicle 
for the maintenance of power relations between elites and the rest of humanity (Foucault; 
1972, 1983, Hall; 1973, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1996, 1997, 2001, Fairclough; 1992a, 1992b, 1995, 
2001, 2003, 2014, and Van Dijk; 1995). But discourse cannot be seen as a homogenous 
phenomenon, given its underlying neurological processes and, in defining the role of beliefs 
and systems of belief in discourse, Hogan 2001) points to a “focalisation” of possibilities that 
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determine whether an audience (or population, class or group) acquiesces to a discourse or 
social system or not, since acquiescence is relative to what they perceive as in the realm of 
possibility or, put differently, relative to perceived alternatives: 
To a great extent, dominant ideology (ideology that fosters consent to the status quo) 
is a matter of beliefs that conceal oppression – from the oppressors, the oppressed, 
and those who fall into neither or both categories – and deny the possibility of an 
alternative, nonoppressive society. In addition, consent is crucially dependent not 
only on what specific views are held to be true but also what views are considered to 
be possible, what claims might be considered as even potentially true. An ideology 
that fosters consent, in other words, operates both by encouraging positive beliefs 
and setting the terms of debate so as to exclude certain sets of possible beliefs from 
consideration or discussion (Hogan, 2001: 59). 
This sums up, in my opinion, the “American46 way of life” as a conscious attempt to define 
and confine the political and social playing field to prevent significant dissent to the status 
quo.47 But (keeping in mind neuroplasticity) the social engineering of dissent depends, not 
only on rejection of alternatives, it also relies on compounding acquiescence: 
It is important to emphasise that these mistaken beliefs are not isolated but part of 
systems of beliefs that are mutually sustaining and “confirming.” For example, 
common ideas about the Gulf War fit into a system of beliefs concerning U.S. foreign 
policy in general, past U.S. wars, and so forth (Hogan, 2001: 60). 
46 The usage of “American” is of course a prime example of this. An entire continent is collapsed in favour 
of a special case, the United States of America, diminishing the signification of all the other countries of 
South and Central America, and Canada, in that process. 
47 Besides McCarthyism in general, see this revealing document indicating the sophistication of CIA 
analysis on the effects of discourse: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP86S00588R000300380001-5.PDF 
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In Avatar, the dynamic of defining the playing field expresses itself in many ways, all derived 
from oversimplification, illustrated especially by its reliance on utopianism. This is discussed 
more fully in section 2.3. 
Applying cognitive insights to the word “discourse” enhances our understanding of how 
ideology is perpetuated by discourse. It becomes clear that ideological discourse follows the 
same sorts of cognitive processes as any other human mental activity: through prototypes, 
exempla, schemas and procedures: 
Cognitive scientists have articulated a general cognitive architecture that is 
empirically well-supported and that provides subtle, flexible descriptive and 
explanatory principles. Within this architecture, there are, roughly, four sorts of 
cognitive contents: schemas, prototypes, exempla, and procedures. A tradition may 
be very loosely defined as some putatively distinctive overlapping of these contents 
(Hogan, 2006: 255). 
This applies then also to the analysis of cultural objects: 
First, in a cognitive account, patterns across an auteur’s work must be the product 
of cognitive architecture, specifically procedural schemas coordinated with the usual 
representational structures – that is, representational schemas, prototypes, and 
exempla (Hogan, 2004: 77). 
A prototype, according to cognitive psychology, may be understood as the “most standard” 
case of a certain broad category (Hogan, 2001: 97): 
In sum, we have good reason to posit prototype approximation as a universal 
principle guiding aesthetic response (i.e., a feeling of beauty; response to art is 
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clearly much broader than a response to beauty). What does this tell us about 
variability in taste? That variability is not likely to be random or unconstrained, since 
our prototypes are unlikely to diverge too massively. They will be constrained by 
averaging (which, again, enters into prototypes) and by certain broad tendencies, 
such as enhancement of difference from contrasting categories, such as male or 
female. (On the last point, in addition to the works cited earlier, see also Chatterjee’s 
discussion of Ramachandran on ‘peak shift’ or the enhancement of response to 
distinguishing properties [Chatterjee 2014, pp. 45–47].) Nonetheless, as with 
nonhabitual pattern isolation, the principle predicts considerable difference in 
particular aesthetic responses. Here, too, the nature of the universal is such that it in 
effect requires at least some diversity in its particularization (Hogan, 2015: 118). 
But prototyping is not the only cognitive content that we have to relate to critical discourse 
theory in particular and cultural studies in general. In this regard, I now turn to the role of 
exempla: 
Exempla can operate to foster consent in a variety of ways. Indeed, they are 
particularly effective ideologically, for the same reason that they frequently override 
schemas: they are often highly salient and affectively charged. They are much more 
noticeable and much more likely to provoke some strong emotion – joy, anger, or 
fear (Hogan, 2001: 105). 
In line with almost all cognitive processing, exempla operate unconsciously (Hogan, 2001: 
108). An exemplum is the idea of something rather than the thing itself.48 For exempla to exist 
and operate in human consciousness, they do not have to be valid, true, objective, falsifiable, 
 
48 Although philosophically important, the scope of this study cannot allow for discussion on the nature of 
reality, whether its components are simulacra or not and whether there is a de facto collapse between a 
“thing” and its representation.  
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scientific or any other epithet. I assume, in this context, “exempla” in its phenomenological 
meaning.49 Following from this, exempla apply to both fictional and non-fictional narratives, 
ideas or perceptions of various sorts:  
… some may be based not on generalizations (that is, schemas and prototypes) but 
on specific instances. Indeed, when an object (such as another person) triggers an 
exemplum, so that the exemplum becomes particularly salient, it will most often 
override conceptualization in terms of schemas or prototypes (Hogan, 2001: 105). 
To sum up, this section has sketched some of the pertinent literature relating to the 
mechanics of attention through the lens of attention schema theory and broadly accepts that 
the construction of the self, or the mind/body binary, are adapted by the evolutionary biology 
of our species. The nature of the self can be described mechanistically as an awareness of the 
brain’s own functioning. 
The section looked briefly at the history of consciousness through some of the major shifts in 
philosophical thought over the last 3,000 years50 on the mind and its relationship to the world, 
and its bedrock of reliance on metaphysics and imagination as fill-ins – basically historical 
place-holders for real knowledge of the brain. Using Gazzaniga’s witty historical perspectives 
and personal experience, a trajectory was drawn of the journey to the reconceptions of central 
human consciousness as multimodal, distributed awareness. 
Advances in science and brain technology, in particular, have advanced scientific knowledge 
49 Similarly, the study cannot delve into different conceptions of phenomenology: critical, realistic, 
constitutive, hermeneutic, etc. I mean it here simply as an approach that concentrates on the study of 
consciousness and the objects of direct experience. 
50 Admittedly, only through a commentary of Gazzaniga’s (2018) writing. 
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to the stage where the insights from these advances can be useful in something as abstract as 
film-analysis, even 3D-specific film analysis. This has been primarily the result of applying 
the framing of consciousness as information processing combined with the insight that human 
subjectivity, our awareness of ourselves as distinct and continuous, can be unpacked through 
analysing attention modelling and schemation, and that it is this schemation that considerably 
affects meaning-making.  
These sorts of extremely immersive media technologies lead to a partial monopolising of 
attention during the act of consumption of the media product, to the extent that they can be 
said to have the inherent danger of colonising attention for the purposes of producing certain 
kinds of awareness. This heightens the importance of a cognitively informed approach to 
mental schemation in the conception and creation of cultural products in general. Applying 
cognitive knowledge to this process of meaning-making greatly capacitates cultural studies, 
especially in their deepening of critical discourse analysis beyond the purely cultural and 
historical, to the evolutionary.   
I argue, therefore, that all the ideas synthesised thus far can be brought under the critical 
theoretical umbrella of cognitive cultural studies. 
2.4 Indigeneity, identity and exclusion: Mechanics of empathy 
In this section, I look at both academic and journalistic literature which may indicate 
understandings of how empathy works in constructing indigeneity through the mental 
schemas of identity and exclusion. To do so, it is necessary to start by conveying some 
understandings primarily from the clinical literature on empathy, since there is a strong 
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dialectical relationship between social consciousness51 and the scientific knowledge that (at 
least partially) legitimates it. I am aware also that here I am making an implicit assumption 
that there are commonalities across the different circumstances in which human cognition 
plays out. Since the literature is complex and extensive, the lens through which I examine it 
is through a selected study (Denno, 2016: 399) which both collates the research but, more 
importantly, frames the study of empathy in its most urgent fashion – as a matter of life and 
death.  
Moving from the basic assumption that human beings find it difficult to kill our own species, 
capital punishment researchers, Johnson, Hritz, Royer and Blume (2016), ask how justice 
systems enable capital punishment and how functionaries52 overcome this revulsion in the 
execution of their tasks: 
The answer lies with the fact that jurors are much less likely to empathize with a 
defendant whom they perceive as not being like them. This process of dehumanization 
is often pursued through explicit, time-tested strategies, such as comparing the 
defendant to a wild, crazed animal or casting him (and it is virtually always a ‘he’) 
as a psychopathic killer. Dehumanization also can be pursued implicitly by 
contrasting the value of a defendant’s life with that of the victim. No matter how it is 
accomplished, dehumanizing a defendant helps to overcome a juror’s human 
inhibition against taking another person’s life. 
Conversely, lawyers for a defendant facing the ultimate punishment generally see 
their task as humanizing their client. Defence lawyers believe that if jurors can 
51 And in this context, the cultural artefacts it produces. 
52 In this case, jurors. 
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identify with the defendant, imagine his ‘walk in life,’ or ‘see the world through his 
eyes,’ they are less likely to choose the death penalty (Johnson et al., 2016). 
The aims of the above research in exploring empathy are therefore similar to some of those 
in this research on Avatar audience cognition. Firstly, it is to identify individual culpability in 
the execution of justice (or in the production of artefacts seeking to change social attitudes 
and values) versus the possibility that emotional universals reduce that individual 
responsibility in the face of damaging social, experiential and material reasons for 
transgressions.53 The second aim appears to identify the empathic requirements of persuasion 
(for and against capital punishment or intended filmic meaning-making outcomes). In the first 
case, both jurors and audiences face the same cognitive challenge, leading to the same deficit 
in judgment, by “systematically discounting the important social, historical, and situational 
determinants of behavior … and correspondingly exaggerating the causal role of dispositional 
or individual characteristics” (Lynch & Haney, 2011: 573, 590). Although neuroscience has 
cast some light on the basic philosophical binary of nature vs. nurture forces in the 
construction of individual responsibility, there is a long way to go to answering these 
fundamentals.54 For example, neuroimaging cannot yet distinguish between sympathetic and 
affective brain responses (Johnson et al., 2016: 578). The second aim, to examine the methods 
of persuasion in making meaning in the courtroom, echoes the task required of both the maker 
of a film and the film’s analysts.  
 
53 Providing for mitigating evidence in the case of the law and similarly providing empathic argument for an 
author’s point of view in filmmaking. 
54 For example, see Oxenham (2016): “It’s another blow for neuroscience. The discovery of major software flaws 
could render thousands of fMRI brain studies inaccurate.” 
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The question one has to insist on is: if another’s life is at the mercy of juror ignorance around 
the motivation of his/her crime, how much more can an individual be excused for 
misunderstanding a film’s intended meaning or an artist failing to fulfil the social expectations 
of his/her peers, critics or markets? 
Most research indicates that, although sympathy involves feeling sadness for another person, 
empathy involves sharing another person’s emotions. But a distinction can be made that 
empathy results from two different neural processes: “(1) an effortful cognitive attempt to 
take on another person’s perspective (i.e., understanding another’s feelings) and (2) an 
affective response to another person’s emotions (i.e., sharing another’s feelings)” (Johnson et 
al., 2016: 579). Further distinctions are necessary. Reflecting mirror neuron theory, the 
consensus amongst researchers is that the cognitive component of empathy is associated with 
increased activity in the frontal and parietal cortices that include networks associated with 
understanding what others are thinking based on their behaviour. Paradoxically, this has led 
to the insight that the affective component of empathy includes one’s own representations of 
behaviour and that “perception of a given behaviour in another individual can automatically 
activate one’s own representations of that behaviour” (Johnson et al., 2016: 578). Even at this 
level of analysis, the binary of emotion vs. rationality/problem-solving starts to break down 
in the face of mental schemation,55 which is inclusive of both emotional and rational/problem-
solving mental processes, at the very least, and shows promise in refining a more complete 
picture of cognition – to include an “affective response to another person’s emotions and a 
cognitive ability to adapt to the other person’s perspective” (Johnson et al., 2016: 575-6).  
 
55 As does the nonsensical binary of emotional vs. cognitive, since I argue cognition includes many simultaneous 
processes across many brain regions. 
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The Johnson et al. (2016) research team, not surprisingly, therefore found that identifying 
another person as being in the same category56 as oneself contributes to a feeling of similarity, 
which increases empathy and, of course, its corollary that outsiders are dehumanised: 
Observations of neural activity reveal a disturbing fact: people respond more 
strongly to the pain of same-race individuals than to the pain of different-race 
individuals. Specifically, neurological mirror systems are less responsive when 
viewing people of another race in pain, thus causing individuals to experience 
decreased sharing of the emotional components of pain in people of another race. 
Moreover, these disparities are correlated with implicit bias levels – participants 
with greater implicit bias are even less affected when viewing physical suffering of 
other-race individuals than are participants with lower levels of implicit bias. One 
factor that may be driving this result is that implicit bias may impact the ability to 
recognise emotions, like sadness and anger, in out-group members. For example, 
individuals with higher levels of implicit bias are quicker to perceive anger in black 
faces compared to white faces (Johnson et al., 2016: 584).  
Elaborating the effects of these implicit biases on the emotions of jurors, Johnson et al.’s 
(2016) research indicates that “people behave toward others according to their perceived level 
of warmth and competence”.57 
If someone is perceived as high competence and high warmth, others view them with pride. 
Envy is associated with high competence and low warmth, and pity is associated with low 
competence and high warmth. If someone is perceived to be low in both warmth and 
 
56 Related research shows that category can be as arbitrarily defined as a temporary division in a game or an 
experiment. 
57 Čehajić, Brown & González (2009: 715, 716–17). 
68 
competence, others will be disgusted by them. Disgust is the only emotion which results58 in 
the dehumanisation of the target and often occurs when the target is an outgroup member. The 
social cognition brain network is activated at a reduced level when participants feel disgust 
toward one another (Johnson et al., 2016: 586). 
Dehumanisation may also happen to justify participation in immoral or violent behaviour, to 
justify past wrongdoing, or “avoid the emotional exhaustion59 associated with helping 
another” (Johnson et al., 2016: 589). This last point, common-sense-based as it is (or perhaps 
because of it), is surprisingly missing from the literature on narratival theory and again, finds 
expression in clinical contexts (Vaes & Muratore, 2013: 185). Johnson et al.’s (2016) research 
indicates that, when helping others is costly (in either cognitive load or emotional 
responsibility and more likely both),60 individuals have decreased motivation to empathise. 
The researchers’ finding that there is choice involved in the capacity for empathy and the 
propensity to allow the experience and expression of it61.  
In other words, where ability and propensity are distinguished (Keysers & Gazzola, 2014: 
163), this lack of expression reflects the fact that “empathy is not automatic but depends on 
attention and motivation” (Johnson et al., 2016: 582).  
 
58 There is an assumption here that emotions are the result of dehumanisation, and not the other way around, and 
this linearity is presumably unintended, but certainly unexamined. 
59 Referred to as the compassion-hostility paradox (De Dreu et al., 2010: 1408-1411). 
60 Although the clinical research does not frame it as such, this choice possibly includes material costs to the 
empathiser. 
61 See also the research on empathy in human babies’ responses, where fMRI scans suggest even pre-verbal 
children have involuntary and automatic physical empathic responses to those around them and have clearly not 
learnt these. However, in a study of older children a total of 55 boys aged 10 to 16 were assessed. Of these, 37 met 
the criteria for children with 'conduct problems', (which can develop into psychopathy later), according to 
questionnaire answers provided by parents and teachers. (https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
2318442/Brain-scans-identify-psychopaths-childhood-empathy-seeing-people-pain.html) 
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It also suggests therefore that psychopaths find those forms of expression costly, arguably too 
costly to bear given the experienced ontologies62 of their pathologies.63  
There appears then, to be evidence that racist prototyping is subject to pattern recognition-
driven cognitive chunking of similar facial features in sets, by habit, leading to stereotyping.64 
However, sensitisation to differences through mitigating experience (in the case of Avatar, 
visually and possibly emotionally) can encourage the remodelling of those stereotypes and an 
acceptance of racial differences. In other words, neural habituation and learning processes can 
either facilitate stereotyping schemation or they can prevent and even change it.  
The Johnson et al. (2016) research team concludes that the “neuroscience of empathy provides 
one more reason to believe that the decision to sentence another human being to death is 
inevitably an arbitrary one, and one that cannot be divorced from either race or caprice” 
(Johnson et al., 2016: 598) but, in an analysis of Avatar (where disembodied/embodied 
immersion is an added factor in empathically-driven audience persuasion), it is necessary to 
delve into the literature directed more to the mechanisms of social cognition, specifically 
those coming out of research on the brain’s multi-sensory spatial mechanisms of the bodily 
self and social cognition.  
It is necessary to sketch some of the insights coming out of multi-sensory spatial theory, since 
it is in the ways empathy intersects with mental schemation of the self and models of the body 
in its relative space in the environment, that form part of cognition. Again, I choose to precis 
 
62 Which is to say, the level of victimship in their own (often early) experience. 
63 This, in turn, implicates social processes in the creation of that psychopathy and therefore decreased criminal 
culpability in the eyes of the law since, when “ability and propensity are distinguished, one interesting result is 
that individuals who are diagnosed with psychopathy (and juveniles diagnosed with a conduct disorder) have 
high ability to emphasize but low propensity to empathize” (Johnson et al., 2016: 582). 
64 If facilitated by contextual factors such as cultural discourse and material societal relations. 
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this knowledge through a relevant theoretical study – one which builds theoretical bridges 
between research on cognition and that of empathy.  
In pursuing Gallese and Cuccio’s proposal that embodied simulation65 is the primary brain 
mechanism underlying “the pre-reflective aspects of social cognition and the bodily self” 
(Gallese & Cuccio, 2015). Christian Pfeiffer compares embodied simulation theory to 
attention schema theory, according to which 
we pre-reflectively empathize with others by predicting their current state of 
attention which involves predicting the spatial focus of attention. Thereby we derive 
a representational model of their state of mind. On this account, spatial coding of 
attention, rather than motor resonance, is the primary mechanism underlying social 
cognition (Pfeiffer, 2015). 
Relevant for this study’s focus on viewership is Pfeiffer’s observation that, because fMRI 
scans show that brain networks underlying social cognition and the bodily self largely 
overlap,66 this indicates that specific functional associations exist (a) between motor 
resonance and body ownership/agency and (b) between multisensory spatial coding and self-
 
65 ES (Embodied simulation theory) proposes that, based on mirror neurons, the brain maps observed actions 
into an action space, into motor potentialities, within our hierarchically-organised motor system and thereby 
infers and predicts the action goals of the individual. In this way, it penetrates the state of mind of the other and 
thus links self and other in a pre-reflective empathetical fashion. I would like to point out that motor resonance, 
i.e., the mapping of observed actions into motor potentialities, necessarily depends on multisensory spatial 
coding. I argue that this is the case because of five points: First, the brain has access to the physical world only 
through the different sensory receptors of the body that bombard it with exteroceptive (e.g., vision, audition), 
proprioceptive (somatosensory, vestibular), and interoceptive (somatosensory, visceral) signals. Second, these 
multisensory signals must be integrated according to their spatial and temporal parameters (Stein & Stanford 
2008) to inform neural representations of the states of the body and of the world around us – including the agents 
whose actions are subject to motor resonance. Third, the observed movements of these agents are coded in 
coordinates distinct from the egocentric spatial frame of reference upon which our motor system operates. 
Fourth, the brain must necessarily perform spatial transformations of the observed movements by the other agent 
into the egocentric frame of reference upon which motor resonance can operate. In sum, multisensory spatial 
coding is a prerequisite of motor resonance (Pfeiffer, 2015: 3). 
66 see Blanken, 2012; Ehrsson 2012; Jeannerod, 2003; Metzinger, 2003. 
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location/the first-person perspective (Pfeiffer, 2015: 5). This includes the role of the gaze67 in 
social cognition and in making meaning of others’ awareness through their state68 of attention 
and therefore their state of mind, emotions and intentions (Beck & Kastner, 2009; Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995 in Pfeiffer, 2015: 4) by locating the whereabouts of others in the 
environment, through our vision and audio spatialisation. Although I cannot divert to discuss 
the neuroscientific literature on temporal mapping in the brain, it is becoming clear that the 
human concept of time is similarly modelled and that, in Piaget’s terms, “time is a cognitive 
construct, a deductive scheme, not an intuition or form of sensibility”69 (Piaget, 1957: 54 cited 
in Sauer,  2014: 4). 
The implications of the cognitive ontology of time have been touched on here since there 
appear to me to be parallel (which is to say analogous) elements between, on one hand, the 
cognitive schemation referred to in these theories and, on the other, ideas around chronotopes 
(Bakhtin, 1975), somatopes (Fernandez, 2014), Haraway’s treatise on the cyborg (1989) and 
the (specific) historicity of critical discourse studies and cultural studies. To incorporate into 
the same conversation concepts across the divides of physiological70 knowledge of the body 
and theories around narratival structure and function is highly epistemologically problematic 
but I will nevertheless attempt a synthesis, albeit it in a spirit of experimentation. To do this, 
it is necessary to open a parallel conversation on the nature of time and space.71 This may 
consequently reflect how time/space schemations become part of the cognitive processes 
 
67 Established as a directiveness of attention, through sight, sound, touch, gravity, etc (Ionta et al. 2011; Pfeiffer, 
2015: 9).  
68 And directedness. 
69 Which is to say an objective phenomenon to perceive and track. 
70 Clinical in the sense of biological knowledge derived from medical observation and experimentation. 
71 The treatment of this topic is by necessity superficial and is done anecdotally.  
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involved in meaning-making in the production, consumption and critique of cultural artefacts. 
This will inform an analysis of Avatar and assist in introducing some understandings of the 
deployment of empathy in the film, the social cognition mechanisms through which the film 
is understood and the universal biologies which capacitate mammalian attention and human 
self-awareness.  
I start this exploration with a discussion of time and of space to explore the effects of these 
concepts on the exercise of awareness and attention in human social cognition, and the 
narratives we form into stories about ourselves. I do this on the presumption that the erroneous 
imaginaries of time and space in science and popular global cultural and linguistic discourse, 
reflecting a (relative) subjective experience of these concepts, have been conceptual place-
holders for a purely human conception of both scientific viewpoints and popular personal 
experience.72 In other words, I propose that they are erroneous constructions standing in for 
real knowledge of these systems, that this is reflected in the cutting edge of academic and 
scientific debate, and that there are historical processes afoot to obsoletise both concepts, 
together with the prevailing underpinning presumptions of the universal centrality of human 
consciousness (in spite of abundant evidence to the contrary).  It is in this vein that we return 
to a discussion of Bakhtin’s chronotope (1988), Fernandez’s somatope (2014) and possible 
extrapolations of these two, in the hope that, by deconstructing the illusions implicated above, 
we may cast light on how these metaphors are constructed. In doing so, I further hope to 
uncover commonalities in the metaphors of time and space used in semiotic models in the 
affective sciences and those of the arts to, in turn, uncover cognitive commonalities between 
 
72 It is hardly surprising that, whatever legitimacy scientific knowledge may claim, it is produced by a purely 
human consciousness and where other means are employed, those means (like mathematical computation) have 
similarly been fashioned along human semiosis. For example, there is no such thing as space, only matter, 
antimatter and energy, and the appearance and illusion of space based on a vague intuition about what is not in 
our visual field. 
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cultural artefacts and that of the cognitive schemation producing those artefacts, and the 
resulting implications for a study of Avatar.  
Bakhtin’s concept of the chronotope73 is an attempt to lay out the structural cognitive field of 
the novel:74 
We will give the name chronotope (literally, ‘time space’) to the intrinsic 
connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed 
in literature … Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; 
likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and 
history (Bakhtin, 1988: 84 cited in Fernandez, 2014: 1122). 
Described as a “temporally articulated space or a spatially articulated tempo” (Fernandez, 
2014: 1122), chronotopes can be conceived as definitive in genre and generic distinctions and 
function as “the primary means for materializing time in space, emerg(ing) as a center for 
concretizing representation, as a force giving body to the entire novel” (Bakhtin, 1984: 251 
cited in Fernandez, 2014: 1123). As Fernandez explains, “The chronotope packs a set of 
signifiers into very little discursive space by drawing on a subconscious set of signs, which 
automatically concatenate into an identifiable scene and predict a plot sequence; a semiosis is 
activated”75 (Fernandez, 2014: 1123). However, Fernandez (drawing on Haraway, 1985) 
makes a further extrapolation of chronotope as somatope. She asserts that representations of 
the body are increasingly central to contemporary narrative and that the importance of this 
chronotope “virtually demands its naming”:  
73 chrono referring to time, and tope referring to space. 
74 which I can project to other media forms. 
75 My emphasis 
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We take ‘soma,’ to signify ‘the body of an organism,’ and, ‘tope,’ to signify ‘place.’ 
Hence, the body place names the somatope. In practice, the somatope carries the 
weight of the obsessions of its narrative. The somatope encodes a host of meanings 
penetrating and surrounding the image of the body. The somatope and its feverish 
references bind all the seemingly unrelated phenomena within the text together (…). 
In somatopic narratives, the body is the site that makes meaning and directs the plot. 
For what happens to the bodies in a somatopic text determines the plot. And bodies 
in somatopic texts are almost always morphing or under contention. The image of 
the body is at dead center of the narrative. The body is the fulcrum of the narrative, 
and the narrative is enslaved to its representations of the body (Fernandez, 2014: 
1124). 
But far from negating time as a definitive category, Fernandez’s focus includes it in her 
reconceptualisation of the chronotype since “[a]n alternate term might be the chronosomatope 
or even the somachronotope but that seems unnecessarily weighty for an already weighty 
theoretical term” (Fernandez, 2014: 1136). Therefore, with the inclusion of the framing of the 
Haraway’s cyborg analogy (1985), a chronosomatope sketches the cognitive landscape of 
cultural production through the triangulation of time (with its constituents of linear 
chronology, sequence recognition, velocity, etc.). It also does so through the body (with its 
sensory motor, body and memory schemas, its empathy neurology, its biological universalism 
and its confinement of the self) and the spatial relationships that mental schemas maintain in 
respect of the body, the body’s environment and its subjective so-called, inner-space:  
The cyborg appears in myth precisely where the boundary between human and 
animal is transgressed. Far from signaling a walling off of people from other living 
beings, cyborgs signal disturbingly and pleasurably tight coupling (151) 
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Haraway, approaching the problem of exclusion and subjugation from the (Foucauldian) point 
of view of the power wielded over (women’s) bodies, and additionally, as a critical theorist 
consciously playing a “blasphemous” role in her militancy to breach epistemological 
boundaries, has the following pertinent synthesis; “I am making an argument for the cyborg 
as a fiction mapping our social and bodily reality” (Haraway, 1991: 150). It could well be that 
this mapping reflects and is enabled by similar processes underpinning all cognitive activities 
and that their subjective experiences appear to resemble a similar pattern of attention 
schemation and a similar spatial and temporal semiotic process of chunking information into 
constituent categories, as placeholders for too much detail, as that which occurs in the brain’s 
physiology. What this insight could lead to is a discussion of pattern recognition in general 
but, for my purposes here, I use it as an introduction to discourses, which I see as mental 
schemations lying somewhere in the hypothetical space between a product, such as a novel, 
and the stories brains tell themselves about who we are, the one producing the other in a 
lifelong dialectical loop.  
This dialectical relationship indicates the important links between how attention is culturally 
entrained and distributed in its global social articulations, the framing of its discourses and 
entrenching power dependencies, whilst using those same discursive formations to gain 
access to a wider audience through superficial empathic support.76 In this sense, empathy has 
been commodified and has been significantly co-opted into hard-sell marketing and the 
expansion of a consumer base for global media. 
Discourses are thus powerful conveyers of stereotypical77 cognitive content. For example, 
 
76 i.e. as in a film like Avatar 
77 Stereotypes being one of the less cognitive and emotional weighty ways to process social information. 
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paradoxically, Avatar has also been criticised as racist in the popular press. CBS News 
reported: 
Robinne Lee, an actress in such recent films as ‘Seven Pounds’ and ‘Hotel for Dogs,’ 
said that ‘Avatar’ was ‘beautiful’ and that she understood the economic logic of 
casting a white lead if most of the audience is white. But she said the film, which so 
far has the second-highest worldwide box-office gross ever, still reminded her of 
Hollywood’s ‘Pocahontas’ story – ‘the Indian woman leads the white man into the 
wilderness, and he learns the way of the people and becomes the savior…. It’s really 
upsetting in many ways,’ said Lee, who is black with Jamaican and Chinese ancestry. 
‘It would be nice if we could save ourselves.’78 
But James Cameron counters this charge with his own interpretation:  
‘I don’t buy that, I don’t think that any of these indigenous people that see their 
reality in the film felt that at all’. He stressed that the reaction of the indigenous 
people has ‘been overwhelmingly positive’, and that the very survival of these people 
is at stake as these ‘highly mechanized, industrialized force[s]’ destroy their forests. 
Responding directly to the ‘white messiah’ critique he added, ‘When all you’ve got 
to fight back with is bows and arrows, there has to be intervention from the 
international community. So I don’t care what race the messiahs are, but we all have 
to be those messiahs, we have to help these people because you can’t stop a bulldozer 
with a bow and arrow’ (Taylor, 2010). 
Cameron added: 
 
78 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/racist-theme-in-avatar/ 
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 … the film asks us to open our eyes and truly see others, respecting them even though 
they are different, in the hope that we may find a way to prevent conflict and live 
more harmoniously on this world. I hardly think that is a racist message’ (Singh, 
2010). 
That Cameron’s critical myopia and lack of insight into how discourses critical of racism can 
themselves perpetuate racism is hardly surprising given the market demands his products 
serve – but there is a further paradox that is more difficult to understand.  As Mayton (2010) 
frames the context of indigenous support for Cameron’s film: 
If Palestinians are dressing in blue and going to the streets in protest to show how 
connected they are to the fictional people of Pandora, does it not also reveal a stark 
reality that they would deny: a foreign saviour is needed if they are to realise their 
goal of throwing off the yoke of Israeli occupation?  
In this context, a discourse critical of Western capitalism legitimates its subject, engraining a 
perspective that remains hidden behind the seemingly scathing critique. But Avatar shows up 
another ambiguity. As Bron Taylor points out:  
(C)ritics including Deloria (1998), Churchill (1998), and Krech (1999) have argued 
that portraying Indians as ecological and countercultural heroes can be harmful to 
real Indians. Displacing them to another planet, however, may have the effect of 
providing audiences with an alternative, and more respectful, context in which to 
gain understanding about what being indigenous might mean (Taylor, 2010: 384).  
Thus, factors, such as the shift in the context within which meaning is made of racial 
differences, allowing a certain disassociation with reality, may have different effects on 
audience identification, depending on other contextual factors. 
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2.5 Literature Review: Findings 
The literature suggests that a process of convergence between culture and biology is well 
under way and this convergence is situated around adaptive behaviour and human cognition 
which play out historically, rendering “debates about the compatibility of the humanities 
and sciences … marginal when culture is revealed as having a biological centre” 
(Krajewska, 2014: 27). David Herman makes the link between these behaviours as “they 
manifest themselves in non-fictional as well as fictional narratives anchored in a variety of 
‘discourse domains’, determining what sorts of ascriptive practices will be governed by norms 
that cut across the fiction/non-fiction distinction” (Herman, 2017: 196). This suggests 
commonalities across human cognition-implicated mental schemation, across most if not all 
forms of imagined semiotic forms, whether they are part of internal fictional or hypothesis-
motivated modelling experience, or the factual world these constructions find material form 
in.   
The point to be highlighted in this section is that a systematic approach to the mechanics of 
narrative involves an interplay between universal species-enacted cognition and historical 
discursive specificity, with culture being the preeminent category for that specificity. A 
systematic approach to a narratival analysis of texts likewise mitigates against inherent 
subjectivities in all79 meaning-making but, rather than achieving objectivity, it corroborates 
evidence in support of particular discourses. 
A brief sketch of Gazzaniga’s view of the history of consciousness indicates the rift in 
 
79 i.e., consumer and analyst consumption of artefacts.  
79 
Western philosophical thought caused by Cartesian dualism but, on the other hand, advances 
in understandings of the nature of consciousness as multi-modal distributed awareness80 and 
an increasing obsolescence of the term “consciousness”. An emerging conception of 
awareness as encompassing task contradictions and complex interactions between 
neocortical and subcortical responses are pervasive in literary responses and behoves the 
analyst to identify these top-down and bottom-up influences in texts. The conclusion of 
this section of the literature review is that an increasing acceptance and usage of attention 
schema theory is opening up how we understand the social cognition of communication 
between and within neural systems – as temporal/spatial/body relationship-modelling 
approximation under constant construction.  
Following Fernandez’s reformulation of Bakhtin’s structural landscaping of the novel as 
constituted by something akin to chronosomatopes, modelled on the analogous 
coordinates of time, body and space in mental schemation, coupled to (culturally 
entrained) narratival and diegetic compulsions of semiosis, reveals possible opportunities 
to detail the particularities of discourses in terms of how they construct relationships 
between time, space and the bodies involved in those configurations. In that sense, 
discourses lie somewhere in the hypothetical space between a product, such as a novel, and 
the stories brains tell ourselves about who we are, the one producing the other in a lifelong 
dialectical loop. 
Using the analogy of the jury, this chapter investigated literature on empathy, finding a strong 
correlation between identity and empathy resulting in the uncomfortable knowledge that 
empathy is implicated in assisting mental schemation in support of, and against, propagation 
 
80 As opposed to a centralised “seat” of consciousness. 
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of stereotypes like racism, through its most basic articulation – inclusion and exclusion of 
perceived group membership. 
Empathy results from two distinct neural processes: “(1) an effortful cognitive attempt to take 
on another person’s perspective (i.e., understanding another’s feelings) and (2) an affective 
response to another person’s emotions (i.e., sharing another’s feelings)” (Johnson et al., 2016: 
579). The affective component of empathy includes one’s own representations of 
behaviour and that “perception of a given behaviour in another individual can automatically 
activate one’s own representations of that behaviour” (Johnson et al., 2016: 578). In any event, 
the effects of identity can be devastating on individuals and groups, leading to (if an effortful 
cognitive attempt to take on another person’s perspective fails) cognitively dysfunctional 
social relations and the discourses propping them up.  
There is the issue of the cognitive load represented by empathic engagement with semiotic 
representations of the other, the emotional and material costs of such engagement, and the 
reschemation of personal and cultural mental models to accommodate such shifts. But far 
from only preventing evolutionarily necessary changes in attitudes to outgroup stereotyping, 
this process is continual and porous even if, paradoxically, existing attitudes and models are 
defended vehemently, open to persuasion, change, reprioritisation and growth, albeit always 
to a greater or lesser extent, negotiated and partial. This has direct implications for other 
audiences (besides juries) since according inordinate importance to personal culpability and 
agency involves “systematically discounting the important social, historical, and situational 
determinants of behavior … and correspondingly exaggerating the causal role of dispositional 
or individual characteristics” (Lynch & Haney, 2011: 573). This appears to me to have bearing 
on how we ascribe attention and agency to the stakeholders in commercial communication 
events: audience, artist, critic and market.  
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CHAPTER 3 AVATAR AND ATTENTION SCHEMA 
3.1 Introduction 
Attention schema theory posits that our subjective experience of ourselves is the awareness 
of our state of attention. Part of that awareness is the attribution of an awareness like ours to 
other beings. This recognition is part of a to-and-fro of mental schema building, the results of 
which are mental models built on our own awareness of ourselves that build on our awareness 
of another’s attention. Michael Graziano clarifies his use of the word, “model”: 
I mean something close to the colloquial term. I mean something reduced, 
simplified, and convenient, that represents something else more complicated, 
like a model airplane represents a real airplane, or a plastic soldier represents 
a real one. A model in the brain, in this use of the word, is an information set 
that is constructed and constantly updated by neuronal machinery and that 
represents something useful to monitor and predict (Graziano, 2013: 60). 
If attention and its awareness function as a survival strategy in our evolution, it may 
follow that the products of the application of attention and the acts of creativity deriving 
from the application of attention, may hold keys to understanding the motivation behind 
that creativity. The following section explores this possibility through the lens of 
attention schema theory. 
3.2 Textual analysis: Attention schema 
It may follow that our state of attention defines our susceptibility to attitudinal change and 
therefore, for Cameron to effect the changes he wants to achieve in his audiences’ value 
systems, he needs to incrementally increase the pressure to shift perspectives over the course 
of the film’s narrative. Those shifts needing to be introduced gradually to become accepted 
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and then habituated. 
Consider the initial arrival and disembarking of the soldiers on Pandora, where Cameron 
employs an interesting shift in the point of view of the camera’s attention, its framing and 
focus.81 This allows us to explore the different ways the term attention is referred to in this 
work: 
The actor-soldiers’ attention is understandably focused on their first impressions of the new 
planet. The hand-held camera, representing the viewer’s point of view is included as one of 
the actors, lending a documentary feel as if the camera has been embedded on a facilities tour 
of enemy lines. This device breaks down the so-called “fourth wall” which traditionally 
separates the audiences’ attention between what is intended for the viewer and what is 
intended only for the story characters. In breaking down this convention, Cameron is making 
a complicated (if undeveloped) statement on the power of the medium and audiences’ own 
acquiescence to that power. 
81 Put differently, Cameron draws a distinction between the attention of the characters within the film and the 
attention he draws of the viewers via narrative, scenes, tension between characters, technologies, etc.  
 Clip 34: Mercenaries disembark with attention switch 
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The trope exploited in this shift in directorial attention is directly developed from images of 
conflict journalism, especially of journalists embedded in American forces in the middle east. 
This has the effect of lending credibility and excitement to the meaning made of this scene, 
as well as drawing the audience in emotionally. In accepting the shift in point of view, viewers 
accept brief membership of the soldier group, potentially allowing for an emotional, empathic 
and attitudinal negotiability in our own attention states and a concomitant empathy with Jake 
who is left behind. This, I would argue, provides for the possibility of attitudinal change 
leading to revisions of the mental models we normally employ to understand the world and 
our place in it, since we perceive others’ positions in it more clearly (or even for the first 
time). Applied to the experience of audience readings of meaning in Avatar, I would assume 
that individual meaning-making includes a consideration of the meaning intended by the 
author, in this case, James Cameron. While a historical materialist analysis may be inclined 
to see Cameron as less an individual than a member of a class with the power of defining 
mainstream cultural discourse (so rendering individual authorial meaning-making spurious), 
attention schema theory provides insight into how authorial intent and the resulting intended 
meanings become negotiated in the theatre experience and through subsequent discursive 
social interactions. 
Since meaning is made according to audiences’ mental schemation, their negotiation of the 
director’s intended meanings and their existing mental models becomes the area in which the 
director needs to work with both narratival and technical clarity. This is also a result of 
discursive involvement after the event – on one side of the continuum, e.g. fandom, and on 
the other, a political movement against showing the film. I briefly frame some of the tensions 
between audience response and what appears to have been intended by Cameron in the 
following clips. It begins with an example of how authorial intent plays a significant role in 
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audience response and how these scenes have been interpreted by different political 
groupings, in the following elaborate visual metaphor of the military/industrial/prison 
complex: 
 
 
 
 
 
The conflux of military, industrial, prison fences and watchtower imagery is an overt visual 
metaphor which Cameron calls our attention to, as is the environmental pollution that results. 
But the viewers’ attention is drawn to this metaphor on several sliding scales, dependent on 
their experience and knowledge of these dynamics in their own lives. This pertains for 
instance to the brutal aesthetic in the composition of the scene, with matching gunmetal blue-
grey filters harmonizing colour with dramatic form, the balance of which I regard as very 
effectively achieved in the final illusion. But one person’s aesthetic appreciation is another’s 
horror, with extensions to hellish associations and a genuine concern for our planet’s survival 
– yet others may simply admire the efficiency of the plant, and wonder what contract workers’ 
rate of pay is, and so forth. Dialogue compounds the metaphor: “Well, ladies…Look 
   
Clip 35: Spaceship lands at fortified refinery on Pandora 
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at all this fresh meat, wooh!”Reminiscent of the welcoming inmates reserve
for new prisoners,82 the coarseness and sneering sexual innuendo compounds Cameron’s 
conflation of prison and military whilst commenting on the calibre and integrity of ex-military 
mercenaries, itself a growing multi-billion-dollar industry.  
In a single set of filmic strokes, Cameron succeeds also in caricaturing another multi-billion-
dollar industry, even more disturbing than the mercenary phenomenon: the privatised prison 
system in the US that serves as a model for global incarceration. He also continues the process 
of re-visualising the modern American male,83 in an attempt to rebuild the hero as empathic 
and sensitive. 
However, even such obvious metaphors may have an oppositional or negotiated meaning. 
Conservative and right-wing criticism of the film is revealing and shows consistent 
oppositional readings of the working of metaphor in popular fiction. In other forms this 
82 Cameron may well have been directly referencing the following sort of fresh prisoner intake epitomised by 
this scene from Shawshank Redemption: https://youtu.be/mR8hHqDygYQ?t=67 
83 Albeit with an Australian actor. 
Clip 36: Male scorn and othering of new recruits 
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criticism takes, oppositional readings come from rejecting the logical distinctions Cameron 
builds in the script and dialogue; they are simply rejected as qualifying variables. In this way, 
conservatives ignore these conceptual distinctions and proceed as if none were made or that 
they are irrelevant. In the next section, I explore a few examples of this a priori ideological 
filtering and positioning, which will illustrate this dynamic.   
The value distinction between Marine and mercenary is well established in the following clip 
– although Jake Sully and his creator, James Cameron, honour the Marine Corps, they are
hostile to mercenaries: 
But as we will see shortly, the distinction between mercenary and Marine, which Cameron 
assumes, is contested by conservative commentators. Similarly, in the next two clips, Clips 
38 and 39, corporate executive, Parker Selfridge, trumpets his racism in such unequivocal 
terms that many viewers would consider the obvious irony clumsy and over-stated. But, as 
we will see, even the most overblown metaphors and ironic references are taken at face value: 
   Clip 37: Male scorn ideological positioning 
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Selfridge’s racist rant on the colour of the Na’vi’s skin is echoed unselfconsciously by 
audiences who are, in fact, racist. 
“This is the only time I ever sat in a theater where people were cheering the forest and the 
blue people attacking ex-Marines,” says conservative activist Tom Roeser. James Balcer, 
decorated Marine veteran, agrees, “The film makes Marines look like lunatics. In reality,” he 
said, “We are a good, generous country that helps people” (Auster, 2010). 
Asked if the film is anti-American and anti-military, Balcer said, “Well, they never 
mentioned America but when you have the eagle, globe and anchor – the Marine 
Corps emblem – it has to be America.” “And that’s the Hollywood view of us,” 
Roeser complained. “We are the exploiters, we are pre-emptive attackers” (Auster, 
2010). 
The conflation of Marine, ex-Marine, mercenary and country, is concerning. The data were 
simply ignored by Roeser and Balcer in favour of crude chunking of input driven by prior 
emotional, attitudinal positioning. Similarly, ironically, my own perception of the Marines in 
the lobby of the Imax cinema was that they had the same dress code as the mercenaries in the 
      Clip 38: Parker’s blue monkeys’ racism      Clip 39: Dr Augustine confronts Parker 
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film. I am then also guilty of simplistic schema-building and I had just seen the film!84 
However, there would be very little chance that Cameron would not have intended the 
meaning drawn from conflating the dress of his actors with those of real Marines. 
Cognitive processes take place, firstly, in a biological environment. But culture is intrinsic to 
cognition in the production and reception of cultural objects, as Krajewska (2014: 17) 
explains: 
For instance, to make a film which correlates with our visual, perceptual, cognitive 
apparatus as human beings, the film maker has to take account of the way the human 
brain processes visual information through the analysis of certain cultural products. 
As a consequence, film relies on a running rate of twenty-four frames per second, an 
obvious example of how film makers have matched our biology to our own benefit in 
understanding the cultural object.  
Interestingly, Cameron works now exclusively at higher frame rates (in excess of 60 frames 
per second) for reasons both technical and aesthetic. Since 3D technologies are fundamentally 
optical illusions, the way attention is coordinated in viewers’ perceptions to achieve the effect 
becomes crucial. Quite besides the areas of discursive contestation in meaning-making, the 
fluidity and perceptual integrity of the 3D medium itself requires considerable technical skill. 
In that sense, the basis of future meaning-making is constructed on a very basic, physiological 
level. This section unpacks how attention is deployed in Avatar in order to discover the 
boundaries of species-specific, biologically based meaning-making and the meanings made 
at a cultural and discursive level, in this case, narratively. Consider the following scene from 
 
84 After many viewings, my mental schemation of the film has grown, but the two dress codes still remain the 
same, fixed as a unity of ambiguity. 
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the film – multi-layered digital compositing techniques are designed to fuse discreet elements 
of a scene into a plausible whole, to be cognitively acceptable to human awareness reliant on 
pattern-recognition. In addition, the level of visual media literacy across global audiences is 
advancing, even if these understandings are unarticulated, unreflexive and differentially 
applied across classes and cultures:  
 
A practiced eye perceives the different frame and shutter rates, and differing resolutions in 
the visual content of the scene; the avatars move more fluidly than their human counterparts, 
the camera movement is different to those added composited elements and the end of Jake’s 
tail is created with a very high framerate possible in the animation techniques used for its 
creation.  
Technically, the animation and compositing techniques required for advanced 3D motion 
graphics demand higher frame rates and resolution to be cognitively plausible to audiences 
and to avoid the appearance of digital visual artefacts. When compositing media assets of 
differing resolutions, colour depth and frame rates into a multi-layered whole, the challenge 
is to overcome the tendency for human perception to continually compare information based 
Clip 40: Frame rates and resolutions 
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on pattern recognition, where the smallest discrepancies stand out. In that sense, Cameron is 
matching emerging technology to increased media literacy, but this is dialectically related – 
emerging technologies increase media literacy as cognitive processing of these technologies 
become habituated in individual brains and part of the social capital of audiences. The literacy 
of digital visual composition is built on original dramatic forms, developing techniques from 
previous craft practices. For example, the stage device of a front act curtain to introduce a 
scene (used here as a camera movement to “reveal” a change in scene), combined with 
“skinning” (graphic overlays on chroma-key surfaces) is designed to focus attention and build 
plausibility and is a major priority in Avatar’s construction. These next two clips illustrate 
this point:  
In theorising Cameron’s use of these technologies, applying Hogan’s idea of “occlusive 
foregrounds” aptly describes Cameron’s use of camera shots as a “complex of procedural and 
representational structures, prominently including a set of relevant prototypes” (Hogan, 2005: 
77). This is where foreground elements in multi-layered digital visual composites play a 
significant role in creating Avatar’s sense of depth and hyper-reality that lends itself to 
capturing audience attention (amplified in 3D) by filmic devices such as pulling focus, which 
is an attempt to draw viewers into the practice of shifting their attention across more focal 
planes, outside their normal point of view. Cameron invests considerable attention in this 
particular meaning-making, since these techniques have the potential to construct 
Clip 41: Composite camera reveal        Clip 42: Composite camera reveal 
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consciously-designed conceptual story worlds and to leverage changing attitudes around the 
vulnerability of audiences to new sensory experiences. 
The device of self-death and rebirth is used extensively in Avatar as a filmic theme but also 
as a way of habituating viewers to the idea of awareness transfer to other beings – a metaphor 
for empathy. To do this, audiences need to, at least by proxy, experience and practice similar 
shifts in attention: how to focus it, how to deflect it, how to split and diffuse it. And this, 
arguably, for the growth of audience members’ self-awareness. Scenes of awareness transfer 
show the research and attention to detail in Avatar’s visuals, and its commitment to provide a 
neurologically informed representation of attention states: 
The theme of consciousness transfer, at the conceptual heart of Avatar, analysed through the 
lens of attention schema theory, uncovers a basic fact: directing audience attention is the 
foundation of consuming a cultural object and that effort directly facilitates the success of the 
mental schemation affordances to audiences. In film, that task falls on the director, and James 
Cameron is indeed the author of his work and, in a real way, his budget. It follows that issues 
of where attention has been given to Avatar’s production budgets reflects the priorities of the 
author. 
      Clip 43: Jake’s awareness transfer to his avatar body 
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The application of attention schema theory reveals that Cameron spent less of his own creative 
attention on the discursive details of his storytelling and the meanings made from his story 
than his technical delivery of the medium. This is very clearly shown in the device of screen 
simulacra which are digitally superimposed semi-transparent visual layers composited to 
provide the appearance of digital display screens:  
 
 
 
   Clip 44: Simulacra composite Clip 45: Reflections within simulacra 
   
The simulacra within simulacra, within screen simulacra, within 3D, within the Avatar 
metaphor, within the theatre viewing experience – this self-reflective irony is prevalent 
throughout the film. It has been achieved through detailed attention to the visual impact of the 
film’s sets and effects, enabled by production design and massive expenditure. This furthers 
the proposition that productive attention has been weighted towards the technical delivery, 
the medium of the film. 
The hero prototype is presented as internal, endemic to Jake’s character, something that 
happens despite environmental pressures and personal circumstances, a part of history yet 
compelled and empowered to transcend it. It also represents Cameron’s modelling of a new 
version of the American male action hero. From initially establishing Jake as disadvantaged, 
a victim of war, climate change, overpopulation and mass unemployment, we proceed to the 
discovery of Jake’s “real” character: honest, straightforward, sensitive and heroic, even in the 
face of dominant sociopathic discourses. Jake’s discursive positioning is disclosed through 
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the attention given to what he says, what he does and the ensuing disparities with the first-
person narrative as voice over. In these scenes, Jake’s interest in, and knowledge of science 
is established as minimal and his discourse reveals the average Marine’s (or American male’s) 
anti-intellectual attitudes: 
Although the discourse of science remains problematic across his character’s development, 
the ethnographic video log device enhances Jake’s self-expression and he embraces it. 
The point being made here is that Cameron accords a very high production value to the 
meaning made on the technical level, often at the expense of narratival clarity. His ongoing 
concern over future productions of the Avatar franchise remains this technical aspect. For this 
to be achieved, ideally, he will need to eliminate all polysemy at that level of audience 
cognition, i.e., at the level of perception.  
3.3 Textual analysis: Attention schema and polysemy 
The research process involved selecting a total of 120 clips for analysis and, of those, 21 are 
tagged with the word “polysemy”. There is clearly not the space or the need to deconstruct 
each one – suffice to say that the film suffers from a lack of care taken in the construction of 
its intended meanings. This results in some confusion with the meanings that the film makes. 
While this study expects and has found that meaning-making is highly subjective and 
     Clip 47: Jake shows his lack of science    Clip 46: Jake shows his lack of science 
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contextual, much of the polysemy that occurs comes from errors in the film’s construction. 
Some of the errors are a result of Cameron’s own cultural myopia, others are because of 
incompletely understood authorial intent. This section teases these dynamics out.  
This next scene’s design is most confusing in the contradictory options for meaning-making 
available to audiences (consider the presence of Theodor Seuss’ storybook in the jungle 
school: “The Lorax”):  
 
This cautionary tale was written to advocate for environmental awareness. Its appearance 
here, in the context of children’s literature and curriculum, ignites polysemous permutations 
to an extreme. Was Dr Augustine trying to tell the indigenous children something about 
learning to live well with nature? Clearly not, since Cameron is at pains to point out their 
harmonious balance. Was the message meant to be that Augustine was warning them? Was 
Cameron making a comment on the use of anthropology in mineral exploitation, signaling its 
obsolescence? Is it anti-intellectual? Could it be that the cultural artefact seen by Cameron as 
progressive environmental education material in real-life Western culture, was imported as a 
Clip 48: Derelict indigenous school 
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sort of muddled whimsy into the set of a film in an exotic world? Why the polysemy in the 
narrative and why the often-ambiguous depiction of the Weaver character?  
“The stingbats knock them down”, says Dr. Augustine, cementing the theme that “nature” 
reasserts the order of things. Possibly. And this in the context of the Seuss reference being 
missed by many audiences, (being only a few frames in duration) except possibly 
unconsciously as part of a filmic ambience.  
As we have seen in this study, attention schema theory concerns itself with mapping out 
approximate models of our attention and those of others. It follows that audiences are 
influenced by what they read as the intended meaning of the author of the work and when this 
involves a film with as much media hype as Avatar enjoyed, even more so. Although authors 
and artists are part of their historical circumstances, individual agency and authorial intent are 
part of the nuanced mental schemation present at the point of consumption of any attention-
demanding medium. It is therefore significant to this study that Cameron produced more 
polysemy in the narrative than he did with the technologies of his medium and it will be 
interesting whether sequels of Avatar will concentrate on clarifying his intended meanings, 
which are arguably more relevant than the vehicle for conveying those meanings. And 
Cameron, despite his obsession with the technical aspects of his work, is quite happy with this 
level of confusion and the resulting polysemy. In the following interview (Ditzian, 2010) he 
describes his audience reception understanding:  
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“Avatar confuses people because it’s got all this cool eye candy and all this cool action, and 
if they’re starting to feel something in the middle of that, it’s kind of OK.” Aesthetic response 
is important for Cameron and key to audience immersion and tolerance of differences, and 
therefore of the film’s political messages “unless you’re a hard right-wing pundit, in which 
case it’s OK, and the whole movie’s ridiculous and fatuous and stupid,” Cameron jokes.  
However, he is quite clear on the meanings he would like audiences, other than those from 
the fringes of mainstream opinion, to take away from the movie.  
In the next clip from the same interview (Ditzian, 2010), Cameron explains some of his 
thinking on the psychology of his meaning-making: 
 
 
Clip 49: Cameron on Avatar’s politics 
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We all know what’s going on, we live in denial about it. Denial is a mental response 
based on fear, fear – of change, of the sacrifices we are going to have to make…. You 
have to fight an emotional response with an emotional response.  
Cameron’s intended meanings are clear in his own mind:  
If you’re tuned in to what’s happening in Avatar, you start to feel a sense of moral 
outrage when you see the tree fall and it’s a compassionate response for these people. 
Then you feel a sense of uplift at the end as good vanquishes evil. If you put those 
two things together, it actually creates a ripe emotional matrix for people to want to 
do something about it.  
This study continues to make the connections between what is intended and that which is not 
in Avatar in the hope that audience meaning-choices are more clearly understood.  
Turning to the philosophies Cameron synthesises in the value system he imbues to his story, 
this diptych illustrates the use of the attention accorded to indigenous communities: 
  
  Clip 50: Cameron on environmental activism 
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                    Clip 51: Na’vi burial rites            Clip 52: Neuropsych bonding with direhorse                   
 
In adhering to a purely Western view of nature, philosophy and the universe, the film portrays 
the indigenous as having the hierarchical right to subject nature to its control, albeit one that 
has more empathy on Pandora. The easy reliance on unexamined popular conceptions of 
Western ethnocentric imaginaries (including those of Eastern and indigenous origin) is often 
at odds with a more sophisticated state of knowledge of the above, especially amongst 
intellectual audiences. Cameron does not claim the epithet of intellectual, nevertheless his 
script would have been more effective if more rigorous and critical understandings had been 
employed in the scripting of Avatar. But, given the nature of polysemy in general and 
particularly as expressed in this film, coupled with its intended market priorities, any 
statement of meaning is necessarily subjective and contestable. Although all beings are 
connected in a neural network on Pandora, not all beings are equal. Was Cameron aware that 
the hierarchical assumption of humanoid superiority and power is problematic in the face of 
the need for harmony and co-dependence with the environment? Cameron’s philosophy has 
been extensively researched by Doru Pop (2009) to trace the multitude of philosophical points 
of view incorporated into Cameron’s popular ecologism but, suffice to say, that his 
philosophical views are so broad and popular in the sense of globalised discourses, that their 
ontologies are, if not irrelevant, not relevant enough for this analysis. This also applies to 
Pop’s (2009) assumption that, what he calls Cameron’s double mirror device to provide 
alternative and sometimes contradictory sets of meaning-making, is in fact intentional. But, 
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as I argue in this context, it is risky attributing such narratival coherence to an author when it 
is so clear that polysemy in Avatar is not always Cameron’s intent. This applies especially to 
the ambiguity in the film’s characters, as in the following Clip 53:  
 
 
 
 
 
The phrase “hearts and minds” was first used in the context of the Vietnam war and this is a 
direct Cameronian reference in the film. It is clear that the film criticises war as a vehicle for 
profiteering however, as Clip 53 shows, the articulation of Parker’s character as a sociopathic 
and predatory mining agent, is arguably overstated. If the intention was to evoke antipathy 
towards him, it potentially backfires because it invites an oppositional reading to the 
characterisation. This, among many other possible readings of the scene, opens intended 
meanings to a range of confusing and distracting messaging for audiences – leading to 
oppositional and negotiated meaning-making, with very different conclusions. 
 3.4 Findings 
Chapter 3 suggests some early conclusions, specifically on the efficacy of cognitive cultural 
Clip 53: Parker with unobtainium 
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studies to provide the perspectives on earning attention,85 empathy86 and narrative theory that 
I use to analyse the film. 
From the preceding textual analysis, it appears that, for Avatar (and any cultural artefact), 
attention is deployed to make intended meaning by the author. But equally, intended meaning 
is negotiated at the point of consumption of the product and afterwards, in other places, and 
in other forms, by the audiences, who are not homogenous, but are forced into a shared 
experience. Attention shift is used to facilitate and leverage attitudinal shift.87 But there are 
different (polysemous) meanings of the concept of attention held by divergent interest parties 
and the attention schema theory opens up this polysemy for analysis.  
The chapter’s findings indicate that, although a film like Avatar is technically innovative, it 
is thoroughly dependent on historically discursive filmic forms.88 This said, form is integral 
to artistic and cultural production and attention schema theory engages with 3D as a form with 
the power to intervene on a perceptual level. Narratives must be entertaining and credible 
enough to be attitude or belief-changing and to make full use of the opportunities for new 
forms of attention that innovative forms introduce.   
Directing audience attention within an environment in which intended meanings are 
consumed is then the task of art or cultural production, rather than the assumption of fixed 
meanings which are liable to be misunderstood, muddled and subverted. This requires a solid 
understanding of the effect of empathy and polysemy on meaning-making. 
 
85 In so doing, constructing the meaning-making environment. 
86 As a mental schemation of others’ subjective experiences. 
87 In terms of belief and values. 
88 i.e. its traditional language. 
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CHAPTER 4  AVATAR AND EMPATHY 
4.1 Textual analysis: Empathy 
A considerable amount of attention has been given to the construction of empathy in building 
Cameron’s emotional response for audiences, since he uses emotional response as a rhetorical 
device in making his arguments and critique. But there is another important reason for paying 
special attention to empathy: its construction is needed to bridge the exclusion of other 
species, races and cultures in our personal empathy sphere. New forms89 of relating to 
personal visual space and virtual (dis)embodiment are integral to digital media. Although 
neuroscience has long known of the ability of animals, including humans, to match even rough 
approximations of form in their media environments, with attachment (a cognitive habituated 
response, bonding and schemation), such attention shifts must be constructed incrementally 
in breaching audience credulity. The challenge though, for Cameron, is that he needs to 
progress viewers through a very rapid process of attachment; a process which must overcome 
resistance in audiences to inclusion of others not perceived as members of their group, 
whether it be on emotional, intellectual or ideological grounds. In short, Cameron needs 
audiences to shift their attention to accepting cross-species love. If Cameron can achieve this, 
even to a limited extent, his argument for human tolerance and acceptance is considerably 
strengthened. The next two scenes graphically show the challenge to audience narratival 
credulity – that of the acceptance of intimacy with the other, since human empathic response, 
although automatic in terms of mirror neuron excitation, is highly mediated by its context – 
cultural and individual. 
 
89 Even to the extent of using different neural pathways to experience them.  
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Audiences must travel on an emotional developmental journey across social boundaries, 
starting at Jake as disabled and rejected, to Jake empowered through a new body, albeit an 
alien one. Cameron’s task is then multifarious, complex and very rewarding if the film 
succeeds in these diverse levels and paradoxes:  
 
 
 
The following series of clips featuring key quotes are presented here in a storyboard style, 
isolated to show the incremental intensity with which Cameron approaches our emotional 
attention on the level of the film’s dialogue. Significantly, verbal dialogue gives way to the 
unspoken, the spectacular and an escalating music score that favours African-sounding choral 
arrangements: 
  
  Clip 54: Jake and Neytiri share love     Clip 55: Jake and Neytiri share love 
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JAKE: “Let’s get it straight up 
front.  I don’t want your pity. 
I know the world’s a cold-ass 
bitch.” 
 
CORPORATE AGENTS: “We’d like to 
speak to you about taking over 
his contract and since your 
gnome is identical to his, you 
could step into his shoes – so 
to speak.” 
 
MERCENARIES: “Check this out, 
man, meals on wheels.”  
“Oh man, that’s just wrong.” 
 
NEYTIRI: (in Na’vi) “Forgive me, 
my brother.” 
Clip 56: Bar scene 
  Clip 57: Cremation scene 
Clip 58: Male scorn and othering 
     Clip 59: Neytiri mercy-killing of viperwolf 
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JAKE: “I’m sorry.” 
 
Sound of fire raging 
 
Theme orchestral music 
 
  
Theme Choral music  
Clip 60: Jake's empathy for fate of school kids 
Clip 61: Direhorse on fire 
       Clip 62: Jake and Neytiri share love 
  Clip 63: Na’vi final celebration      
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But empathy is a complex affair and Cameron does not shy away from exploring the limits of 
an empathically-driven culture. In Clip 64, Jake is asked to end Tsu’tey’s life, to perform an 
act of ultimate empathy and moral courage. This scene was omitted in the screen release, due 
to the assumed moral sensitivity of theatre audiences.  
 
The studio presumably thought it was dealing with a different, possibly broader audience 
when it released this cut scene in the Extended Collector’s version, on which this discourse 
analysis is based. This is a climactic moment in the film and a culmination of a long series of 
empathy-building scenarios that the audience shares with the protagonists. 
Avatar’s creator views his own efforts in an artistic light, designing and physically drawing 
most of the visually specific elements of the “world” Avatar exists in.90  Years in the making, 
and in his directing, Cameron quite consciously searches for an emotional effervescence in 
his actors, which “releases the magic.”91 He regards the creative process as “bringing your 
90 As he did in the film Aliens where he collaborated with H.R. Giger. 
91 James Cameron, Brent Dunham (2012). “James Cameron: Interviews”, p.116, Univ. Press of Mississippi
. 
Clip 64: Tsu’tey’s euthanasia 
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imagination into manifestation” (Cameron, 2010a). This study interrogates Cameron’s tools 
and choices for materialising these ideas in his storytelling and how this impacts on our 
cognition and meaning-making as audiences. 
4.2 Textual analysis: Empathy and polysemy 
Meaning through empathy is made polysemous through interactions between meanings from 
different parts of the medium – well depicted in this early scene (Clip 65 below). There is an 
obvious disconnect between Jake’s voice-over narrative and his actions, between the 
expressed values in those narratives and the counter-values he acts upon: 
Clip 65: Jake switches attention 
It is useful to consider the original script92 to uncover how audience attention is designed to 
shift between meaning choices and how audiences are encouraged to develop their own 
oppositional readings of surface meaning presented in the dialogue: 
INT. ROWDY BAR – NIGHT Not the kind of place you’d bring 
92http://web.archive.org/web/20100525105437/http://www.foxscreenings.com/media/pdf/JamesCameronAVA
TAR.pdf. 
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your mom. We find Jake near the pool table, BALANCING his 
chair, front wheels off the ground, while holding a 
tequila shot on his forehead.  ONLOOKERS, including some 
other disabled vets, CLAP and WHOOP. Jake grabs the glass, 
SLAMS down the shot as they cheer.  A WALL-SIZED SCREEN 
filled with the World Cup game – men RUNNING on antelope 
legs. CU JAKE, watching what he can’t have.  Expression 
stony. JAKE (V.O.) ‘Let’s get it straight up front. I 
don’t want your pity. I know the world’s a cold-ass 
bitch.’ Jake’s eyes shift – HIS POD, seeing the bar 
through gaps in the crowd.  A MAN on a barstool SLAPS the 
WOMAN he’s with.  Hard.  She cowers but he’s got her arm, 
shouting, raising his fist.  An eternal tableau.  People 
look away. CU JAKE – not looking away. TIGHT ON JAKE’S 
HAND as he starts pushing the wheel of his chair. TRACKING 
WITH HIM as he rolls forward. 
JAKE (V.O.) ‘It’s just the way things are. And nobody You 
want a fair deal, you’re on the wrong planet. The strong 
prey on the weak. Nobody does a damn thing.’ Jake stops, 
unnoticed, next to the bullying man.  He leans down and 
grabs one leg of the man’s barstool – and YANKS. The chair 
flips.  The guy goes down HARD and JAKE hurls himself 
from the wheelchair, toppling on the guy, getting a grip 
on him like a pit bull and PUNCHING the crap out of him, 
right there on the floor. 
It is worth noting that this scene shows a shifting perspective as regards Jake’s attention. First, 
the centre of attention in the crowd, then an abrupt camera cut showing his self-reflective 
observation of the soccer game on a screen (a simulacra of healthy athletes running and 
kicking), then to a woman being bullied. In other words, Jake’s attention moves from self-
gratification to an empathic, protective mental schema of the situation in the bar, which leads 
to selfless action. 
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 However, there is another sense that meaning, through empathy, is made polysemous – 
directly, through dialogue. Scenes which are written as interactions between characters reveal 
the intention of the writer in respect of overt meanings since they rely on a more directive 
verbal narratival level than the meta-narrative Cameron employs for some of his other 
intended meanings. It should therefore follow that, where polysemy appears in the dialogue, 
that that polysemy is intended or it needs to be seen as accidental. But it is exactly the problem 
of intention that is the fuzziest to define: 
NEYTIRI ‘This you must feel inside … You will have one 
chance, Jake.’ ‘How will I know if he chooses me?’ ‘He 
will try to kill you.’ 
In the context of one of the first empathic touches between Jake and Neytiri, Neytiri sketches 
a view of Pandora as a place where only the fittest survive but, by fittest Darwin meant fittest, 
not strongest and, in this context, the most empathic. The view of evolution, as necessarily 
conforming to earth’s DNA reflecting a patriarchal, violent view of history, is challenged by 
Cameron’s introduction of hexapods and bizarre flora but he appears to subscribe to the 
Clip 66: Neytiri and Jake share an empathic moment 
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mainstream confusion about evolution as conflict.93 The dialogue in this scene serves to 
heighten drama but at the expense of interrogating our power relations with nature, terrestrial 
or other, and therefore with other species, races and cultures. This, I would argue, introduces 
an unintended, even unexamined, range of meanings into the dialogue, compounded by even 
more confounding visuals. The following exchange between Augustine and Sully shows 
where they agree, while the direction suggests that Cameron thought they should not, shows 
the historical loss of status academics are experiencing in the face of pressing economic 
imperatives: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But the meaning-making is muddled and the resulting polysemy in this scene includes the 
perception that Cameron was certainly making a point about war and provocation, to the 
detriment of the logical flow of his script. This leads to confusion for the viewer as to whom 
to support in this argument – that is not an argument. In the following three scenes, at 
Augustine and Jake’s first meeting and her subsequent complaints to Parker Selfridge, 
 
93 It is no surprise then to find the Avatar Theme Park as part of Disney World’s Animal Kingdom, Orlando 
Florida. 
Clip 67: Jake argues with Augustine on policy 
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Weaver’s dialogue is so ill-considered and implausible that it forces an ambiguous 
characterisation of Dr Augustine which the film continues to compound to an unclear purpose. 
This often pits dialogue against narrative, performing functions of what Cameron intends to 
be made clear in the story, at the expense of his characters.  
    Clip 68: Jake meets Augustine Clip 69: Augustine confronts Parker Clip 70: Parker and unobtainium 
4.3 Findings 
An enormous expenditure of filmic directorial attention has been spent on Avatar’s 
engagement with empathy since it is Cameron’s view that attitudes can be changed by using 
empathy as a rhetorical device in an emotional environment of immersion in his action-packed 
spectacular “eye-candy”.94 There are undeniable opportunities in new forms of filmic 
experience, but deploying this technology must be used incrementally in order to be 
acceptable to most viewers. Likewise, a textual analysis of Avatar’s use of empathy indicates 
the film’s use of shifts in director’s and actors’ attention (their gaze) and that a rift is created 
in audience perceptions of messaging. This tension results in a counter-discourse, which is 
the film’s intended meaning. In that sense, polysemy is built into the film’s messaging to 
provide for a wide range of commercial successes, as much as it is part of the craft of 
Cameron’s persuasion. But unintended meanings also proliferate since the way attention has 
been invested in highlights the film’s priorities and areas of improvement. 
 
94 As part of his idea of his persuasive power, see http://www.mtv.com/video-clips/jsu5l4/james-cameron-talks-
about-the-political-response-to-avatar 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter collates and evaluates the findings relating to the central problem of the study, 
which is an explanation of Avatar’s achievement in offering a successfully polysemic 
meaning-making experience for audiences despite, or perhaps because of its many 
contradictions. 
The aims of this study were, firstly, to show the complementarities of cultural studies and 
cognitive science in the critique of cultural objects and, secondly, through those lenses to 
undertake a cognitive and cultural materialist analysis of Avatar, as an exemplary case study 
in that critique. However, any informed analysis changes the textual reading of a text and, by 
subjecting it to its conceptual mould, increases its meaning. If it is broadly axiomatic that an 
analysis, done using the underpinning of a theory/theories, is always more structured and 
relies less on an intuitive approach to any cultural text, then the selection of theories used 
becomes crucial. The preceding chapters provide the case study specificity required to 
demonstrate the arguments around the use of attention and empathy in meaning-making in 
Avatar and, in so doing, serve the overarching aim of the study: to put the “cognitive” back 
into cultural studies. 
Polysemic, often contradictory and even paradoxical ranges of meaning-making by Avatar 
audiences are revealed in media responses to the film. The argument is made that the analysis 
of those responses requires the use of cognitively oriented models (reconceived as schemas) 
of explanation. These originate in biology and, more specifically, in neuroscience, cognitive 
narratology and certain conceptions of critical discourse theory and are collectively adapted 
as a fresh approach to cultural studies. This research contributes to the project of reimagining 
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the field as cognitive cultural studies. The study found, especially in cognitive cultural studies’ 
deepening of critical discourse analysis beyond the purely cultural and historical, significant 
conceptual references to the evolutionary-informed meta-discourse of the physical sciences 
in the interdisciplinary collaboration. This is directly due to the influence of evolutionary 
theory prevalent in those sciences.  In section 2.3, the links between Graziano’s views of the 
construction of the personal self as an adaptive survival mechanism of consciousness are 
tracked through Gazzaniga’s account of the history of philosophical speculation in this regard. 
The historical turning point, represented by Darwin’s detailed biological research, took that 
thought into empirical validation and proved to be fundamental in later work in clinical 
physiology and experimental psychology. Tracking the growth of this firmly established trend 
of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences will continue to be interesting on an 
epistemological level.  The development of a cognitively informed view of meaning-making 
and therefore of the interpretation of texts, especially in the work of Hogan, Boyd, Herman 
and others that underpin the analysis in this present study, lends credibility to the notion of 
re-inserting the word “cognitive” into the term “cultural studies”.    
The relevance of cognitive neuroscience and its relationship to understanding polysemy is 
broadened to other frameworks of Avatar’s narratives; networks, neuro-technology, cognitive 
psychological manipulation and neuro-marketing are shown for their innovative and creative 
relevance to meaning-making in the production cultures of the fictional film industry. A 
systematic approach to the mechanics of narrative employed in this analysis, involved an 
interplay between universal species-enacted cognition and historical discursive specificity, 
with culture being the preeminent category for this specificity. Narratives must be entertaining 
and credible enough to be attitude or belief-changing in order to make full use of the 
opportunities for new forms of attention innovative forms introduce. This said, form is integral 
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to artistic and cultural production and attention schema theory engages with 3D as a form with 
the power to intervene on a perceptual level.   
From the textual analysis, it appears that, for Avatar (and any cultural artefact), attention is 
deployed to make intended meaning by the author. But equally, intended meaning is 
negotiated at the point of consumption of the product and afterwards, in other places, and in 
other forms, by audiences who are not homogenous but are nevertheless forced into a shared 
experience. Similarly, individual members of audiences prioritise different attention points in 
the film, producing and amplifying some forms of attention to the detriment of others. 
Directing audience attention within an environment in which intended meanings are 
consumed is then the task of art or cultural production, rather than the assumption of fixed 
meanings which are liable to be misunderstood, muddled and subverted. This requires a solid 
understanding of the effect of empathy and polysemy on meaning-making and was, I think, 
clearly indicated in the textual analysis of Avatar in Chapters Three and Four. 
A shift of attention is used to facilitate and leverage attitudinal shift95. But, in an analysis of 
Avatar, there are different (polysemous) meanings of the concept of attention held by 
divergent interest parties and the attention schema theory opens up this polysemy for analysis, 
as is demonstrated by the extensive discussion of Graziano’s work. 
While the cognitive and species-specific biological components and working mechanisms of 
humans provide for a vast range of cultural possibilities within our own bodies’ confines, a 
critical, discursive approach is essential to making sense of the way the elements of history 
and biology fuse in any one moment, in any particular culture. A systematic narratival 
 
95 In terms of belief and values. 
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approach to the analysis of texts likewise mitigates against inherent subjectivities in all96 
meaning-making but, rather than achieving objectivity, it corroborates evidence in support of 
particular discourses.  
Extremely immersive media technologies lead to an increase in the monopolising of attention 
during the act of consumption of the media product to the extent they can be said to have the 
inherent danger of colonising attention for the purposes of producing certain kinds of 
awareness.97 This heightens the importance of a cognitively informed approach to mental 
schemation in the conception and creation of cultural products in general. For example, in the 
first few minutes of the film, the Avatar script repeats the phrase, “Watch it!” three times, 
both as a device to call attention to Jake’s vulnerability, but also as an overt admonition to the 
audience to pay the requisite attention to the film’s messages. In the same way, Neytiri 
repeatedly admonishes Jake for his “baby” status in the milieu of Na’vi social capital, 
similarly encouraging the audience to accept our own inexperience in cultural exchange.  This 
use of cognitive psychology-informed rhetorical devices is consciously deployed in the film. 
Applying cognitive knowledge to this process of meaning-making greatly capacitates cultural 
studies in that it uses the appropriate tools to uncover the manipulation of responses to the 
film, 
The reformulation of Bakhtin’s structural landscaping, as constituted by something akin 
to chronosomatopes, is modelled on the analogous coordinates of time, body and space 
in the mental schematic. When coupled to the narratival (culturally entrained) and 
diegetic compulsions of semiosis, it reveals possible opportunities to detail the 
 
96 i.e. consumer and analyst consumption of artefacts.  
97 Especially important for producing compliance to advertising, propaganda and false news. 
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particularities of discourses in terms of how they construct relationships between time, 
space and the bodies involved in those configurations. In that sense, the discourses lie 
somewhere in the hypothetical space between a product, such as a novel, and the stories that 
our brains tell us about who we are – the one producing the other in a lifelong dialectical loop. 
The research uncovered the issue of the cognitive load represented by empathic engagement 
with semiotic representations of the other, the emotional and material costs of such 
engagement, and the reschemation of personal and cultural mental models to accommodate 
such shifts. And, far from only preventing evolutionarily necessary changes in attitudes to 
outgroup stereotyping, this process is continual and porous, even if, paradoxically, existing 
attitudes and models are defended vehemently. They still function as open to persuasion and 
change, reprioritisation and growth, albeit always, to a greater or lesser extent, negotiated and 
partial. This has direct implications for other audiences (besides juries) since according 
inordinate importance to personal culpability and agency involves “systematically 
discounting the important social, historical, and situational determinants of behavior … and 
correspondingly exaggerating the causal role of dispositional or individual characteristics” 
(Lynch & Haney, 2011). This appears to have a bearing on how we ascribe attention and 
agency to the stakeholders in commercial communication events – audience, artist, critic and 
market. 
The point being made here is that Cameron accords a very high production value to the 
meaning made on the technical level, often at the expense of narratival clarity. His ongoing 
concern over future productions of the Avatar franchise remains this technical aspect and, for 
this to be ideally achieved, he will need to eliminate all polysemy at that level of audience 
cognition, i.e., at the level of perception. It is highly likely that the ongoing franchise of the 
Avatar brand will give Cameron the technical experience and therefore the resulting narratival 
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attention needed to perfect the physiological reception of his medium. This may then, at the 
level of meaning-making, facilitate his commitment to provide a little of everything for 
audiences, i.e. his commitment to polysemy in his films’ messages, without compromising 
the messages of change he appears committed to.  
In undertaking this research on this specific film, the impact of emergent cultural phenomena 
in digital media was assessed for its contribution to contested meaning-making and 
highlighted the role of technology in facilitating meaning. This, in turn, recognises the 
concomitant increasing need for global media literacy. Debates on the responsibility of 
academics and artists, in both their individual and social capacities, are greatly enhanced 
through the lens of attention schema theory. In this view, artists become custodians of social 
cognition that is built on the recognition that social cognition manufactures social reality. 
With the rise of our global information society, philosophy has become popularised and 
themes pertinent to the meaning of recurring philosophical issues abound in Avatar. These 
are mind/body dualisms, life as constructed reality (in the post-modern sense as well as in the 
mechanistic), free will, the nature of mind and the inevitability of power’s corruptive force. 
As such, the fact that the film draws attention to attention as an internal awareness process 
intrinsic to consciousness (in the attention schema theory sense of the terms) is a kind of 
narratival response to contemporary social contradictions and divisions. Philosophical 
concerns in filmic creation are not new – how Avatar achieves a lens to current philosophical 
concerns is innovative in the attempted welding of message and medium (in the McLuhanian 
sense). It is difficult to disentangle the two in Avatar’s production and, for most, Cameron’s 
filmic medium advances may always feel like the message itself.  
However, attention schema theory used for textual analysis is not something that is being 
readily attempted. While there is considerable support of cognitive science-informed 
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methodologies (Boyd, Hogan, Herman) in textual analysis, attention schema theory is not yet 
deployed in textual analysis. This can be explained by the need for the addition of 
complementary critical theory disciples of discourse studies and political economy unified 
under a framework such as cultural studies. Forms of interdisciplinary research require 
mastery of its sub-disciplines and, since these disciplines are under-synthesised in their 
theoretical articulations, a working knowledge of discrete disciplines is required – currently 
implying years of learning. While admittedly far from fully developed, this study is an attempt 
to encourage further use of attention schema theory as an interpretive science by 
demonstrating the value of working on a fully functional set of tools offered by cognitive 
cultural studies. 
Since empathy is part of the cognitive structure of mental schemation, it is always present in 
social cognition. Social cognition is a determinant of the forms that problem solving takes in 
cultures resulting in even a pursuit, such as pure mathematics, being fraught, for example with 
empathically-informed mental schemation of colleagues’ expectations and their need for 
funds to continue their research. In that sense, empathy is always useful to consider in the 
context of the social cognition of cultural artefacts but, in Avatar, it was especially effective, 
since empathy was used as a persuasive tactic and its deployment in the film can be recognised 
as a structural rhetorical device. The construction of this device has been thoroughly exposed 
by a cognitively-informed approach to empathy and emotion. 
Although human empathic response leading to the acceptance of intimacy with the other, 
although automatic in terms of mirror neuron excitation, is highly mediated by its context – 
cultural and individual. Audiences must travel an emotional developmental journey across 
social boundaries, starting at Jake as disabled and rejected, to Jake empowered through a new 
body, albeit an alien one. 
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The analysis of Avatar has shown that attention shifts must be constructed incrementally to 
be credible to audiences. The challenge though, for Cameron, was that he needed to progress 
viewers through a very rapid process of attachment, which needed to overcome resistance in 
audiences to the inclusion of others not perceived as members of their group, whether on 
emotional, intellectual or ideological grounds. In short, Cameron needed audiences to shift 
their attention to accepting cross-species love. The extent to which Cameron achieved this, 
even to a limited extent, strengthened his argument for human tolerance and acceptance. 
Cameron’s task was multifarious, complex and very rewarding in the ways the film succeeds 
in those diverse levels and paradoxes. 
However, paradoxically, a film would not be considered immersive if its messages could not 
even temporarily suspend the analytic perspectives of an analyst. But, since meaning, even of 
an immediate delivery medium such as film, is made over time and social space, the impact 
of the film on the analyst is highly mediated according to the analytic tools framing its 
methodology.  
The polysemy of the film is amplified by the highly divergent foci of the theories in the 
literature review. Viewed from an environmental point of view, the film could be considered 
progressive but, from a political economy perspective, the contradictions in interest and 
representation are apparent in the film. From a gender studies perspective, meanings attributed 
to the representation of women in the film indicate new methods which show up old 
stereotypes. Conversely, from an anthropological view, the film may be seen as celebrating 
matriarchy and ritual in communal living yet, at the same time, the film attacks anthropology 
as a discipline implicated in corporate expansion which offers ambiguous rewards for 
indigenous peoples, whilst cyber study futurists celebrate the possibility of an evolutionary 
jump into machine consciousness. Not only is there something for everyone’s mental 
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schemation in the audiences’ meaning-making, it appears to be the case for academic analysts 
too, with the range of interpretations corresponding to the number of interpretive frameworks 
employed.  
Likewise, ideological positioning is a powerful attributor of meaning and the film has 
interesting paradoxes for ideologues. The contradiction presented by the framing of 
Cameron’s characters, as either subjects or agents of their reality-based counterparts, is a case 
in point. If Palestinians who protest adorned in blue paint indeed proclaim the need for a 
foreign saviour to realise their goal of throwing off the yoke of Israeli occupation98 then, in 
this context, a discourse critical of Western capitalism legitimates its subject, engraining a 
perspective that remains hidden behind the seemingly scathing critique. But similarly, it can 
be argued that the Palestinian, looking to raise awareness of his/her captivity, has a right to 
his/her own meaning-making and does not require the analyst to point out a contradiction that 
may not be the lived experience of that Palestinian. 
But Avatar shows up another ambiguity. In the context of misrepresentations of indigenous 
real-life actors and their very real issues and interests, the film exploits their circumstances to 
provide fodder for a Western industrial audience.99 However, an oppositional reading to that 
is that displacing them to another planet may have the effect of providing audiences with an 
alternative, and more respectful, context in which to gain understanding about what being 
indigenous might mean (Taylor, 2010). This interpretation is hinged on a sort of simulated 
attachment we may experience to Avatars, which we may not be able to countenance in real 
life – a simulacra of original experience mediated by fictionally narrated experience, a kind 
 
98 https://shokrylina.wordpress.com/2013/06/24/re-visiting-the-racism-in-james-camerons-avatar/ 
99 Deloria (1998), Churchill (1998), and Krech (1999)  
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of role-play exercise, with Bettelheimian overtones.100  
Additionally, the argument is made that the scholarship itself indicates the power that 
discursive formations have in influencing the meaning-making of cultural artefacts. In this 
context, it is exercised by many academics and the ways in which this study panders to a 
critical theory perspective is no exception.  
For those academics that are tasked with teaching, the exercise of power in media products is 
often predicated on illiteracy and the resulting vulnerability to the co-option of audience 
attention. This study clearly shows the importance of more sophisticated programmes for 
advanced media literacy and the urgent need for that literacy to be disseminated on a popular 
level. 
Avatar is a block-busting exemplum of its genre and the lessons learnt in its analysis are 
transferable to other films, with different genres. I would go so far as to say that the scientific 
principles of observability, formulation, testing and modification of hypotheses, and 
reproducibility underpinning this work are transferable to analyses of similar films and other 
cultural texts. 
The onus falls on the success of a multi-disciplinary corroboration101 of the explanatory power 
of its analysis. It is my view that the dichotomy of culture and cognition is plausibly reconciled 
in this study and represents validation for the recent interest in a newly conceived “cognitive 
cultural studies”. Through the selective application of this interdisciplinary approach, the 
 
100 in his fusion of myth and psychoanalysis. See Bruno Bettelheim, The uses of Enchantment: The meaning and 
importance of fairy tales (1976) London: Thames & Hudson. 
101 More accurately, “synthesis”. 
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study contributes to an understanding of what cognitive cultural studies research denotes – 
used with reference to the recent increasing accessibility of knowledge about the brain. More 
particularly, this study’s title, Neural narratives and natives: Cognitive attention schema 
theory and empathy in the film, Avatar, appears to me to have been a useful snapshot of the 
tasks and framing informing such interdisciplinarity. 
Speaking personally, immersion into these theories has provided rich sets of layers of meaning 
to my appreciation of Avatar. The understanding of attention schema theory has been 
cognitively demanding and, at times, has slipped from my conscious attention, like 
understandings of the dialectic or particle physics. The comprehension of this knowledge has 
enriched all levels of my cognitive experience. The understanding of empathy’s almost 
schizophrenically paradoxical functions in social cohesion and violence has impacted on my 
own emotional experience of my life.  
The exercise of analysis on the film at this level has made me aware of the neuroscience of 
audience manipulation and marketing in the construction of its polysemy. Adding cognitive 
perspectives to my practice as a media producer and cultural studies theorist has rejuvenated 
my capacity to be more creative and live a more useful life, in short, to create myself as a 
work of art. 
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EPILOGUE 
As we threaded our way through the return crowds of anecdotal evidence at a Florida Disney 
resort to check in and sign up for a timeshare sales pitch cleverly disguised as breakfast, I 
considered this new level of transmedia simulacra. Extending the illusion of film to the 
duplicity of commercial practice, Hollywood culture is built and exported through repeat 
experiences, where the novelty of entertainment gives way to the comfortable safety and 
familiar packaging of material (and family) needs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
My First Time Visitor badge being the potential beginning of a lifetime relationship with 
Disney, ending with the bequest of my timeshare to my descendants, I checked on its 
authenticity and was relieved to see that it was genuine.102 Firstly, it was metal, but more 
importantly, it had been issued by a real cast member103 at Pandora. Being a symbol of the 
transience of filmic immersion and hype extended and transcended through time, culture and 
a spurious habitation of advertising space,  
 
102 http://collectivepop.com/top-10-most-expensive-disney-trading-pins/ 
103 Where cast is a Disney employee. 
Figure 3: Disney World badge 
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I examined my free button closely. The badge is a simulacrum of a simulacrum – the bringing 
into the material of a fleeting fictional experience, itself multi-layered sets of simulacra. If I 
continue to collect these badges, I may one day sell mine for real money, completing the 
meaning-making circuit of this artefact in its representation, identity, production, 
consumption and its regulation, and the transformation of its meaning into capital.  
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